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ABSTRACT 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to analyze selected 
senatorial speeches for and against using military force 
against Iraq. 
Hypothesis 
It was hypothesized that Richard Weaver's hierarchy of 
argument will provide a useful framework for the 
identification of arguments and philosophical inclination of 
the speakers. 
Materials 
The primary documents comprising this study were the 
four speeches found in Vital Speeches Q..f. the Day by Senator 
Robert Dole (R-KS), Senator George Mitchell <D-ME>. Senator 
John C. Danforth <R-MO>. and Senator Sam Nunn <D-GA). All 
were delivered in the Senate between January 10-12. 1991. 
The speakers chosen were well-respected members of the 
Senate. 
Methodology 
Clark & Johannesen (1976-77) and Johannesen, 
Strickland. and Eubanks (1970) have praised the late Richard 
M. Weaver for his hierarchical division of arguments. 
McClerren (1990) used Weaver's hierarchy to identify the 
philosophical starting points of those involved in the 
debate over abortion. 
Weaver's hierarchy of argument was employed to 
analyze the senatorial speeches (Weaver, 1970, pp. 201-225>. 
This method named several types of argument (definition, 
analogy, cause-effect, and testimony) and classifies them by 
their perceived merit. 
This study followed Weaver's hierarchy by showing how 
the arguments used can help in identifying the philosophical 
inclinations of the speaker. 
Conclusion 
The results of the study demonstrate that the 
hierarchy of argument Weaver created was an effective basis 
for identifying philosophical inclinations and rhetorical 
arguments. 
All speakers favored argument by definition <Dole & 
Danforth 9, Mitchell 8, and Nunn 6 uses each). the next 
most favored argument was cause-effect (Mitchell 6, Danforth 
5, Dole & Nunn 4). Third was analogy (Dole 8, Danforth & 
Nunn 4, Mitchell 2) and finally testimony <Nunn 9, Mitchell 
4, Danforth 1, Dole 0). 
All Senators leaned toward idealism. The pro-force 
Senators, Dole & Danforth, used the most idealistic 
arguments. The anti-forces Senators <Mitchell & Nunn) used 
more pragmatic and realistic arguments. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Weaver's hierarchy should be further tested by 
application to other speeches dealing with a variety of 
political and social issues. Criteria for the 
identification of philosophy should be further refined. 
This thesis is dedicated to Christine who waited 
patiently. my mother who wouldn't let me quit. and Dr. 
McClerren whose influence and scholarship will always remain 
with me. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most significant military events to take 
place in the post-Viet Nam era was the Persian Gulf War. As 
usual the president of the United States had to win majority 
approval in both the House and Senate before he could order 
troops into action. While the troops waited in the sands of 
Saudi Arabia congressional debate was at an impassioned 
level. The purpose of this study is to analyze selected 
speeches given in the U.S. Senate in early January 1991 
concerning the vote on using military force against Iraq in 
the Persian Gulf. A modified qualitative methodology 
suggested by Richard Weaver concerning hierarchy of argument 
will be the method of analysis. 
CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH & METHODOLOGY 
Statement of Purpose 
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The purpose of this study is to analyze selected 
senatorial speeches for and against using military 
force against Iraq from a rhetorical stand-point. 
Hypothesis 
It is hypothesized that Richard Weaver's hierarchy of 
argument will provide a useful framework for the 
identification of arguments and philosophical inclination. 
Limitations of Study 
This study will be limited to two speeches affirming 
and two speeches negating President Bush's proposal to use 
force against Iraq. 
Significance of Study 
Because this study is an analysis of public debate, by 
public officials, on matters that affect political policy it 
will be of interest to those in the speech communication 
field, especially those concerned with rhetoric and public 
address, history. and political science. Clark & Johannesen 
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(1977) contend that "One of Richard Weaver's most important 
and controversial contributions to contemporary rhetorical 
theory is the concept of the hierarchical ethical worth of 
arguments." It will also add to the literature which is 
part of the growing field of political communication. This 
study will also be of interest because of the scarcity of 
communication literature on the Gulf War to date. It may 
prove to be a stepping-stone to further and more advanced 
studies of Persian Gulf oratory. Above all, this study will 
have personal significance to me, as a student and teacher 
of communication. 
Materials 
The primary documents comprising this study are the 
four speeches found in Vital Speeches of the Day: by Senator 
Robert Dole, delivered to the Senate, January 12, 1991: 
Senator George Mitchell, delivered to the Senate, January 
10, 1991: Senator John C. Danforth, delivered to the Senate, 
January 10, 1991: and Senator Sam Nunn, delivered to the 
Senate, January 10, 1991. The primary sources of 
biographical information were Current Biography and 
Congressional Quarterly's: Politics in America. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
While the Speech Communication Association Journals and 
other recognized communication journals have not yet 
published articles concerning the Persian Gulf Debates 
volumes were written concerning the social and political 
nature of the war and debates. One author <Shanker, 1991, 
p. 7) did come up with a rhetorical article demonstrating 
how in the debates the congressmen leaned heavily on 
recalling history. He said that congressmen quoted 
Socrates, Lincoln, Augustine, Aquinas, Madison, and 
Churchill. They also alluded to the Mexican-American War, 
The Peloponnesian War, World Wars I and II, and Viet Nam. 
He added that "no one could have followed the debates or had 
an intelligent opinion about the wisest course of action in 
the Gulf without at least a basic knowledge of history" 
(1991, p. 7). 
Both liberal and conservative voices were heard. 
Oliver North's publication The Free American (1991) 
published the names of all congressmen who voted against the 
President and featured some of their ill-fated quotes. It 
was noted <Kondracke, 1991, pp. 11-12) that the Persian 
Gulf War was the first "Republican" war as all others were 
entered into by Democrats and that the G.O.P. again was 
credited as being the "strength party" while the democrats 
got pinned with looking weak. Representative Stephen Solarz 
<D-NY) said he could not accept the Viet Nam analogy and 
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predicted a "decisive victory in months. if not weeks" 
<Kondracke, Feb. 7-14, 1991, p. 18). Barnes (1991) 
explained how Bush managed to form a coalition of 
Republicans and helpful Democrats in order to show bi-
partisan strength. 
Other articles depicted the whole effort as a 
presidential power play aimed at shifting attention from the 
ailing economy and to make Bush look strong. An un-named 
author in Commonweal considered the ethical dimensions of 
the war and ended by questioning why we are so eager to fix 
the rest of the world while we ourselves lie in such 
disrepair (1991, pp. 115-117). White claimed that Bush's 
switch from sanctions to force was a mistake which made 
Hussein a hero, inflamed Arab nationalism, and caused the 
U.S. to lose credibility with the U.N. (1991. pp. 118-119). 
Kownacki (1991, pp. 119-120) noted sadly how we managed to 
market the patriotism of war while not showing the human 
faces that were the victims of destruction. Hehir is less 
harsh in his criticism, setting forth a criteria to justify 
going to war and concluding that the war effort was "just 
but unwise" (1991, pp. 125-126). 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Kuwait 
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In 1991 Kuwait observed its thirtieth official year of 
independence. Although their independence is officially 
only thirty years old, the kingdom-sheikdom of Kuwait dates 
to ancient Greek, Persian, and Indian times. Present day 
Kuwait covers a 17,820 square kilometer area on the north-
western corner of the Arabian Gulf between latitudes 28 and 
30 north and longitudes 46 and 48 east <Al-Barges, 1986, p. 
12). The population exceeds 1.7 million. 
Kuwait has been an important commercial port in the 
Persian Gulf since the eighteenth century. The only problem 
being that the surrounding countries coveted the small port 
country. Well aware of this Sheik Mubarak-Al-Subah signed a 
treaty with Britain in 1899 guaranteeing that Britain would 
protect it in return for the promise that Kuwait would 
neither come under foreign leadership nor sell any part of 
Kuwait without Britain's consent. In 1922 Sheik Ahmed Al-
Jaber signed a peace agreement which demarcated the 
boundaries of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. By 1950 the 
development of Kuwait's oil reserves and its adoption of 
western governmental practices caused it to become a 
developed industrial nation. On June 1961, Sheik Abdullah 
Al-Salem, together with the British Political Resident, 
agreed to abrogate the 1899 treaty allowing Kuwait to become 
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a fully independent state (Hamoud Al-Barges. 1986, pp. 26-
2 7 ) . 
Iraq 
Present day Iraq has only existed since 1920 when the 
British government mandated its existence. It has a land 
area of 170.000 square miles and a population of over 14 
million (Marr, 1985. p. 1). Its borders are British 
prescribed and largely artificial. As a result they have 
been a source of challenge from within and without since 
Iraq's conception. 
Before British occupation of the land. the Ottoman 
Turks held and exercised great influence over Iraq (Marr. 
1985. p. 19). Their influence on the customs and culture of 
Iraq are second only to the Arab-Muslim predominance of the 
area. The British impact includes Iraq's drive toward 
modernization. Arabization of government. and the creation 
of an Iraqi nationalist movement spear-headed by officials 
largely placed in power by the British themselves <Marr. 
1985. p. 29). 
Although Britain mandated Iraq in 1920 it wasn't until 
1929 that a newly elected Labor government announced Iraq's 
admission into the League of Nations and three years later 
signed a treaty recognizing Iraq's independence. In the 
following decades a growing movement toward Arab unity 
developed epitomized by the Ba'thist party (Saddam's vehicle 
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of power). Under King Ghazi some parties in Iraq called for 
the uniting of Iraq and Kuwait based on the fact that Kuwait 
had once been part of the administrative district of Basra 
during the Ottoman period (Ghareeb, 1986, p. 61). 
Fortunately for the Kuwaitis the British consistently 
opposed this idea. 
Once the British granted sovereignty to Kuwait in 1961 
Iraqi leader Abd al-Karim Qasim attempted to annex Kuwait 
claiming that the nation "arbitrarily held by imperialism" 
now belonged to Iraq. This appeal was ended with the 
installation of an official Ba'thist government in 1963 that 
was not as concerned with having Kuwait at the time. 
There was a good rapport between the two countries 
during the seventies. During the eighties Iraq was 
preoccupied with its war against Iran. Kuwait was actually 
somewhat of an ally to Iraq during the war, supplying Iraq 
with billions in loans, some interest-free, and supplying 
Iraqi oil customers with their own in order to continue 
Iraq's oil revenues (Crusoe, 1986, p. 3 4 ) • 
However, Iraq emerged from the war as the largest Arab 
power with the fourth largest army in the world. By 1989 it 
had 99 brigades and 1,080,000 men, plus the republican 
guard, popular army forces, and a huge air force. Since 
that time it has imported weapons at three times the rate of 
Iran and has built a military-industrial complex which is 
the mainstay of Iraqi industry. By this time Iraq saw 
itself as the regional power fit to unify the Arab world. 
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In order to have 
their way with Kuwait Iraq tried to take Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain out of the picture through security agreements 
signed in 1989 calling for non-interference in internal 
affairs and banning the use of force <Meguid. et al. 1990 p. 
3 3). 
Annexing Kuwait may have been an aim of Iraq for 
decades but it wasn't until August 2. 1990 that they claimed 
Kuwait rightly belonged to Iraq and sent in the tanks. 
The War 
On August 2, 1990 the world was shocked as the Iraqi 
army rolled through Kuwait, Iraq's small neighbor to the 
south. Shortly thereafter came the announcement by Iraq's 
leader. Saddam Hussein, that Iraq had officially annexed 
Kuwait and that he had no intention of withdrawing then. or 
ever. 
The United Nations almost immediately condemned the 
action as a violent expansionist move on the part of Iraq. 
Under the orchestration of U.S. president George Bush 
economic sanctions were quickly agreed upon by most U.N. 
member nations and imposed against Iraq. 
A few days after the invasion President Bush was on 
the airwaves explaining why he was deploying U.S. troops to 
the area. As he spoke plane and ship loads of U.S. 
military personnel and equipment were on there way to Saudi 
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Arabia to set up a protective defense code-named "Operation 
Desert Shield." 
This action was taken because Bush had doubts that 
economic sanctions alone would be enough flush Iraq out of 
Kuwait and was busy working for more clout, both in the U.N. 
and the U.S. Congress. His problem was that he faced a 
Democratically controlled Congress that was not anxious to 
go to war and a U.N. that wanted, above all, a diplomatic 
solution. He gained U.N. support for the use of force when 
all diplomatic efforts with Iraq failed. The Congress was a 
tougher nut to crack. Many congressmen and women were 
already angry that Bush had deployed troops without their 
consent and outwardly he seemed to be saying that he did not 
need it--that he was acting within his legitimate powers as 
the president. 
The major point of constitutional contention was 
Article 1, Section 8 which states that "the Congress shall 
have power ... to declare war." Many felt the president was 
trying to do so on his own. Of the nine wars that have been 
declared only The War of 1812 was debated beforehand. As a 
result of the gradual escalation of the Viet Nam conflict 
and the lives of U.S. soldiers lost in the process Congress 
enacted the War Powers Resolution in 1973 which requires the 
president to report to Congress when the U.S. enters 
"hostilities or situations where imminent involvement is 
necessary" (Orrick, March 1991, p. 67). 
In late December Bush persuaded the U.N. to issue a 
deadline for Iraqi withdrawal: January 15, 1991. 
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Meanwhile 
Congress was debating whether to allow the president to use 
force if Iraq did not withdraw by the deadline. Congress 
finally voted to authorize the use of force on January 12, 
1991. 
The January 15 deadline passed and Iraq did not 
withdraw. Within a day the multi-national force began 
bombing and Operation Desert Shield became Operation Desert 
Storm. The nation sat glued to their television sets as the 
bombing continued. After weeks of bombing a ground-war 
ensued on Sunday, February 24 resulting in a decisive 
American victory. President Bush ordered a cease-fire at 
midnight Wednesday. February 27 exactly one-hundred hours 
after the assault began. 
The Debates 
The senatorial debates on whether or not to go to war 
in the Persian Gulf against Iraq were extremely intense 
resulting in a narrow (52-47) victory for George Bush. 
Adding to the intensity was the fact that these were the 
first congressional debates concerning war powers to be 
completely televised (via C-Span). The following quotes 
selected by Reader's Digest (March, 1991) suggest the 
intensity of the debates. 
Anti-forces: 
Voting against the resolution David Boren <D. Okla.) 
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said, "Not a single one of us can escape the judgement of 
history which will be rendered upon the actions we take 
today." Sen. Paul Wellstone CD, Minn.) prophesied, "If we 
rush to war, it will be a nightmare in the Persian Gulf. 
Our country will be torn apart ... " Sen. Edward Kennedy <D. 
Mass.) said that the 45,000 body bags the Pentagon has sent 
to the region are all the evidence we need of the high price 
in lives and blood that we will have to pay." Ernest F. 
Hollings asked, "Is Kuwait worth the life of a GI? Not at 
all." Sen. Terry Sanford CD. N.C.) said, "We are going to 
see this nation go to a war that certainly does not need to 
be fought--the most unnecessary war in the history of this 
nation." Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan belittled the whole effort 
stating. "nothing large has happened. A nasty little 
country invaded a littler but just as nasty country" 
(Congressional Record, Jan. 1-15, 1991). 
Pro-forces a 
A small majority of senators felt just as strongly 
that decisive military action was needed. Voting for the 
resolution, Sen. Malcom Wallop (R, Wyo.) said, "The time to 
act in now, while we have the advantage, while we have the 
means amassed in the right place and while we can keep the 
loss of life at a minimum. To prolong the crisis bids up 
the ultimate price. Can we not summon the courage to make 
clear to the American people what is at stake and what their 
sons are being asked to fight for? The President has. 
Cannot this body have the courage to do the same?" 
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(Congressional Record, Jan. 1-15, 1991). 
The president's supporters felt that the use of force 
could restore Kuwait's legitimate government. stabilize the 
Persian Gulf. maintain access to middle-east oil. neutralize 
Iraq's chemical. biological. and nuclear threat. and pave 
the way for a new world order based on international law. 
They also feared the coalition would dissolve before 
economic sanctions took effect. The president's opponents 
felt that sanctions could work if given enough time. They 
feared that the cost in lives and resources would be too 
great. exacerbating existing domestic problems. Sanctions 
and diplomacy was by and large the anti-force line. 
The debate lasted many days with impassioned and 
eloquent voices being heard on both sides of the issue. 
Covering every speech would prove to be too cumbersome. 
therefore a handful of highly visible representative 
speakers had to be chosen. 
SELECTION OF SPEAKERS AND SPEECHES 
Narrowing the selection of representative speakers for 
both sides of the issue was a difficult task. First. I 
attempted to read through the Congressional Record to 
discover speeches of comparable intensity and length. The 
volume of material was overwhelming. As a result. it was 
impossible to get perfectly equal texts. Some speeches were 
long. Some were brief. 
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Some speakers yielded to others for 
brief remarks. Next. I wrote both Illinois Senators and 
asked them to identify the best speeches pro and con. My 
only reply came from Sen. Paul Simon <D. Ill.)--whose letter 
is found in the appendix. I considered selecting 
transcripts from C-Span but decided against the idea because 
the Congressional record would provide approximately the 
same material with hard copy. My search for representative 
speeches ended with the February 1. 1991 issue of Vital 
Speeches of the Day which featured speeches by four senators 
(two for the resolution and two against). 
The four speeches were by Senators Robert Dole <R. 
KS). John Danforth <R. MO). George Mitchell <D. ME). and Sam 
Nunn <D. GA). Dole and Danforth spoke in favor of the 
resolution while Mitchell and Nunn spoke against it. The 
fact that these speakers were chosen by Vital Speeches alone 
make their speeches worthy of study but there are other 
reasons. All four speakers are highly visible members of 
the Senate with records that make them good spokesmen on the 
issue. 
Sen. Robert Dole 
Bob Dole is a senior Republican Senator from the state 
of Kansas. Born on July 22. 1923 in Russell. Kansas to a 
middle class family. he attended University of Kansas from 
1941 to 1943 until he enlisted in the army. He became a war 
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hero of sorts, winning the bronze star, the purple heart and 
was elevated to the rank of captain. He has never recovered 
fully from his war injury. He lost the use of his right arm 
and has only partial use of his left arm. After his army 
career he got his bachelors and law degrees from Washburn 
University; the last in 1952. 
Dole's political career began in the Kansas House in 
1951. After that he became the Russell County Attorney, was 
elected to the U. S. House of Representatives, and then to 
the Senate. He was the Republican nominee for vice-
president in 1976, and ran for president in 1980 and 1988. 
His aggressive style got him the post of majority leader in 
the 1971 Senate and remains the minority leader in a now 
Democratically controlled Senate. A political workaholic he 
sits on four committees: Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry; Finance; Rules and Administration; and Joint 
Taxation. He has historically been a champion of Republican 
conservatism and conservative presidential administrations 
as well as a watchdog for Democratic ones (Moritz. 1972, pp. 
107-109; Duncan, 1989, pp. 552-556). 
Sen. John Danforth 
Speaking also for the resolution to authorize the 
President to use force was Republican Senator John C. 
Danforth of Missouri. Danforth was born in St. Louis 
September, 5. 1936. He holds degrees in religion from 
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Princeton and law from Yale and has practiced in both areas. 
From 1969 to 1977 he was the Attorney General of Missouri. 
Danforth is noted as having made one of the more 
successful transitions from majority to minority status in 
the Senate. having lost little influence and effectiveness. 
He has worked well with Democrats in many areas including a 
successful partnership with Lloyd Bentsen who assumed his 
position as chairman of the Finance Subcommittee on Trade. 
His position on abortion causes him to stand out clearly 
however. He has been behind various legislation cutting 
state funds for abortion. In 1989 he moved from the Budget 
Committee to the Select Committee on Intelligence and has 
worked well with Democrats there. 
Although in this debate they are on opposite sides of 
the issue Danforth had earlier teamed up with George 
Mitchell of Maine to restore credit for low-income housing 
investments. Deeply concerned about world hunger. he helped 
win some $150 million in aid for Africa after touring the 
drought ravaged continent <Duncan. 1989. pp. 841). 
Danforth's membership on the Select Intelligence 
Committee afforded him special insight with which to 
consider and make judgement on Iraq's capacity for war. His 
former membership on the finance committee. including his 
ranking membership on the subcommittee concerning 
international trade made him capable of sound judgement on 
the economic ramifications of both sanctions and military 
action. Having also been a member of the Committee for 
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Commerce, Science and Transportation makes him keenly aware 
of the effect Iraq can have on the world's oil supply 
(Duncan, 1989, pp. 840-843). 
Sen. George Mitchell 
Speaking against the authorization of force was George 
J. Mitchell <Dern. - Maine). Mitchell was born August 20, 
1933 in Waterville, Maine. His degrees include a B.A. from 
Bowdoin College and an LL.B. from Georgetown University and 
spent two years in the army. 
Starting out as a lawyer Mitchell has made for himself 
a successful legal-political career. In 1966 he became the 
Maine Democratic Party Chairman and held that position until 
1968. In 1974 he made an unsuccessful run for governor of 
Maine as the Democratic nominee. Later he was appointed by 
Jimmy Carter as U.S. Attorney General for Maine. His close 
relationship with Edmund Muskie landed him this position and 
gained him national attention. He was a federal judge when 
he was appointed to fill a vacant Senate seat from Maine. 
He won his first bid for re-election hands down and kept 
moving steadily but cautiously upward, winning .the 
prestigious title of Senate Majority Leader. Always a 
Reagan antagonist Mitchell once said after the 1986 State of 
the Union speech that the president uses "rhetoric that 
refuses to face the real world" (Duncan, 1989, p. 637). 
However, his major political focus since he arrived in the 
Senate seems to be the environment, which may explain his 
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reluctance to go to war in the crude oil laden Persian Gulf. 
As a member of the Committee for the Environment and Public 
Works he worked on increasing the "Superfund" bill which 
requires chemical companies to finance hazardous-waste 
cleanup, creating a $30 million program for compensation of 
victims of toxic incidents, cutting down acid rain, and 
reauthorizing the Clean Water Act. Mitchell also serves on 
the Finance Committee and the Committee for Veterans' 
Affairs <Duncan, 1989, pp. 636-639). 
Sen. Samm Nunn 
Sam Nunn (Dem.-Georgia) also spoke against the 
authorization of force in the Persian Gulf. Nunn was born 
in Perry, GA on September, 8, 1938 to farming parents. His 
one important tie to politics being his great-uncle Carl 
Vinson who chaired the House Armed Services Committee. He 
spent three years at the Georgia Institute of Technology 
before signing up with the Coast Guard. When he returned he 
obtained a bachelors and law degree from Emory University. 
Before being elected to the Senate in 1972 he spent three 
years in the Georgia House. 
Senator Nunn is highly noted for his expertise on the 
defense. As one writer states, "Nunn's demeanor is a church 
deacon's: sober, deliberate and stern, his work ethic well 
worn. But on matter of national defense, he wears the high 
priest's robes. He retreats into a mountain of facts and 
emerges with opinions that exert broad influence on defense 
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policy" (Duncan. 1989. p. 351). After touring NATO more 
than once he recommended forces be beefed up there in order 
that the U.S. might not have to rely so heavily on a solely 
nuclear threat. Although he criticized the way Reagan 
managed defense funds he always approved of his defense 
spending increases. highly uncharacteristic of a Democrat. 
However. it was his conservatism which got him where he is 
today propelled into office by the conservative Democratic 
Southern voters. 
In the past he has called for a reinstitution of the 
draft and submitted legislation requiring eighteen-year-old 
males to register with the Selective Service. He 
successfully opposed the nominations of John Tower as 
Secretary of Defense and Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in 
partisan debate which removed some of his non-partisan 
reputation. After Tower's rejection Bob Dole accused Nunn 
of gazing longingly across the Potomac at the Pentagon and 
leading a Democratic power grab (Duncan. 1989. pp. 351-354; 
Moritz. 1980. pp. 285-288). 
Domestically Nunn has concentrated on social welfare. 
education. and rural and urban development but his great 
strength lies in his defense knowledge. Other committees he 
has served on include Governmental Affairs. Select 
Intelligence and Small Business. Many feel he would make a 
good Democratic candidate for President but he has yet to 
fulfill their wishes. He once jokingly said. referring to 
Jimmy Carter. that he doesn't think the nation will want to 
Gulf War Debates 
27 
see another Georgian President in his life time (Duncan. 
1989. p. 351)." 
METHODOLOGY 
Concerning Richard M. Weaver. Kirschke (1979) called 
him "one of the clearest thinkers of the twentieth century" 
and suggested that he has not received the critical 
attention he deserves. Gaynor (1979) depicted Weaver as a 
brilliant conservative thinker who "primarily concerned 
himself with the ideas of the intellectual and political 
leaders of society." Clark & Johannesen (1976-77) and 
Johannesen. Strikland 1 & Eubanks (1970) have praised Weaver 
for his hierarchical division of arguments. McClerren 
(1990) used Weaver's hierarchy to pin-point the 
philosophical frameworks of those involved in the debate 
over abortion. 
The methodology I will employ to analyze the speeches 
of these four Senators is adapted from the late Richard M. 
Weaver's hierarchy of argument (1970, pp. 201-225). 
Weaver's hierarchy identifies several types of argument and 
classifies them by their perceived merit. The types that he 
names. in the order which he lists them. include argument by 
definition, similitude (analogy). cause-effect, and 
testimony (1970 1 p. 209). 
Gulf War Debates 
28 
Hierarchy Q.f. Argument 
Arguing from Definition 
Concerning argument by definition he speaks of 
essence. "One way to interpret a subject is to define its 
nature--to describe the fixed features of its being. 
Definition is an attempt to capture essence. When we speak 
of the nature of a thing, we speak of something we expect to 
persist. Definitions accordingly deal with fundamental and 
unchanging properties" (1970, p. 209). Arguing from 
definition then uses the thing referred to and speaks of its 
implicit characteristics. Simply put Weaver (1974, p. 137) 
says that "all arguments made from the nature of a thing" 
are definition. For instance, when addressing the slavery 
issue Abraham Lincoln always argued that the negro was fully 
human. In this argument the negro was the subject and his 
humanity was his essence or one of his chief implicit 
characteristics. Once this definition is established all 
other rights must necessarily follow, e.g., freedom, the 
right to vote, paid employment, etc. 
Weaver classifies argument by definition as the 
highest form of argument. His reason is a metaphysical one 
which holds that being, not becoming, is the highest 
reality. (1970, p. 212). This metaphysical belief 
"ascribes to the highest reality qualities of stasis, 
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immutability, [and] eternal perdurance." It is really the 
simple assertion that "that which is perfect does not change 
and that which has to change is less perfect" (Weaver, 1970, 
p. 212). The one who can argue from unchanging essences 
therefore is the one who speaks of what is most real. 
Many, in this age of pseudo-relativism, would argue 
that there are no fixed realities or transcendent values. 
However, to make a statement of this nature is only to prove 
their existence. Would it not be a fixed reality that there 
were no universals if, in fact, there were none? Even if it 
were true that there were only a few the very use of one 
would indeed constitute the highest form of argument. 
When the framers of the Declaration of Independence 
decided that they "hold these truths to be self evident, 
that all men are created equal ... " they were arguing from 
definition. They defined the human being as a creature who 
is inherently entitled to these rights regardless of opinion 
otherwise. In their thinking these entitlements were 
transcendent realities, precisely what Richard Weaver was 
explaining. While this type of argument would not lend 
itself to external verification it is hard to refute since 
every individual, whether under democracy or tyranny. feels 
the need for these things. 
Similitude or analogy 
The next highest form of argument in Weaver's 
hierarchy is similitude or analogy. This type. he asserts, 
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is favored by imaginative types--poets, writers, etc. When 
our knowledge of a subject presents only probable proof we 
employ analogy because it relates the subject to one that we 
know more about. "All analogy depends upon a theory that if 
two things resemble in a certain number of respects, it is 
probable that they resemble in still further respects" 
(Weaver, 1974, p. 142). Analogy infers that there is an 
essence to the subject even though it is not readily 
apparent. In Weaver's mind then, analogy is one step 
removed from definition. He explains that sometimes 
analogies are employed for tact, allowing the audience to 
reason out the assertion for themselves. 
Of similitude he says, "A [good] way to interpret a 
subject is in terms of relationships of similarity and 
dissimilarity. We say that it is like something which we 
know in fuller detail, or that it is unlike that thing in 
important respects. From such a comparison a conclusion 
regarding the subject itself can be drawn. This is a very 
common form of argument, by which probabilities can be 
established. And since probabilities are all we have to go 
on in many questions of this life, it must be accounted a 
usable means of persuasion" (1970, p. 209). We commonly 
call this type of argument analogy. Jesus' message about 
the Kingdom of God was always communicated through analogy. 
"The kingdom of God is like a mustard seed ... a lost coin ... a 
pearl of great price ... wheat and tares, etc." As the 
Scripture says, "without a parable spake he not unto them" 
(Matthew 13:34, KJV). 
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Weaver (1970, p. 214) sets forth a cosmological 
example of analogy, saying, 
"The cosmos is one vast system of analogy, so that our 
profoundest intuitions of it are made in the form of 
comparisons. To affirm that something is like 
something else is to begin to talk about the 
unitariness of creation. Everything is like everything 
else somehow, so that we have a ladder of similitude 
mounting up to the final one-ness--to something like a 
unity in godhead. Furthermore, there is about this 
source of argument a kind of decent reticence, a 
recognition of the unknown along with the known. There 
is a recognition that the unknown may be continuous 
with the known, so that man is moving about in a world 
only partly realized, yet real in all its parts." 
Weaver's choice of similitude as the second form of argument 
in his hierarchy undoubtedly stems from the fact that he 
believed rhetoric to be a largely humanistic enterprise, 
lending itself to qualitative, rather than quantitative, 
analysis. 
Arguing from Cause-Effect 
Weaver (1971) says, "another way to interpret a 
subject is to place it in a cause-and-effect relationship. 
The process of interpretation is then to affirm it as the 
cause of some effect or as the effect of some cause. And 
the attitudes of those who are listening will be affected 
according to whether or not they agree with our cause-and-
effect analysis" (p. 209). For instance, someone might 
argue that the lack of national emission control standards 
on automobiles is the cause of high levels of carbon-dioxide 
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in the air. Air pollution would be the perceived effect 
with lack of regulations the cause. "The rhetorical force 
of the 
argument depends upon our acceptance of the truth of the 
cause-and-effect relationship which is affirmed in the major 
premise" (Weaver, 1974, p. 140). 
Cause-effect is the third type of argument in Weaver's 
hierarchy. Although he is not overly impressed with cause-
effect reasoning he admits that we cannot escape its use 
because we are historical people. All historical events are 
either causes of some effect or effects of some cause. 
Metaphysically speaking, cause-effect reasoning "operates in 
the realm of becoming" as opposed to being (Weaver, 1970, p. 
214). The idealist Weaver, who advocates being over 
becoming, notes that the primary users of cause-effect 
reasoning are pragmatic thinkers. 
Weaver (1970) tells us, "It is not unusual today to 
find a lengthy piece of journalism or an entire political 
speech which is nothing but a series of arguments from 
consequence--completely devoid of reference to principle or 
defined ideas. We rightly recognize these as sensational 
types of appeal" (p. 214). He argues that cause-effect 
argument offers the temptation to overuse fear appeals by 
overemphasizing the negative effect of some cause. Many 
today (environmentalists, et al.) are guilty of this very 
thing. For instance, we are warned so incessantly about the 
"green-house effect," which still remains a theory, that we 
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begin to believe that it is already coming to pass. 
An even poorer sub-variety of this type of argument is 
argument from circumstance which doesn't even offer a cause-
effect relationship. Circumstance. Weaver argues. is 
nothing more than a "surrender of reason." He considers it 
acceptable only when there is nothing left to plead. An 
example we hear constantly is "we must adapt ourselves to a 
fast changing world." This oft-quoted saying offers no good 
reasons why we should change with the world nor what would 
happen if we did not. Circumstance. in this methodology. is 
subsumed by cause-effect which. in general. "is a lower-
order source of argument because it deals in the realm of 
the phenomenal" which is easily "converted into the 
sensational." something all true scholars diligently try to 
avoid (1970. p. 215). 
Testimony 
Argument from testimony is last in Weaver's hierarchy 
but is not necessarily the lowest form. When a person 
argues from testimony some authority on a given subject is 
cited. 
Weaver (1974. p. 146) says that arguments based on 
testimony "have no intrinsic force." Whatever power they 
carry comes from the weight of the authority. Some of the 
proposed experts are indeed expert and some are questionable 
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at best. For example. concerning political matters one 
could cite Henry Kissinger or Lyndon LaRouche. The person 
one cites says much about his or her intelligence and 
discretion. 
Weaver says. "the sound maxim is that an argument 
based on authority is [only] as good as the authority" (p. 
214). When applying the methodology that will be taken into 
account. 
Testimony uses the knowledge or opinion of another who 
has more authority to comment on the subject under dispute. 
Weaver (1970. pp. 209-210) says. "If we are not in position 
to see or examine. but can procure the deposition of one who 
is. the deposition may become the substance of our argument. 
We can slip it into syllogism just as we would a defined 
term. The same is true of general statements which come 
from quarters of great authority or prestige." Quoting a 
child-psychologist concerning children's affective issues or 
citing the Bible on a moral issue are both instances of 
testimony. 
PHILOSOPHIES AND ARGUMENTS 
Weaver hints at the idea that the type of arguments 
useds lends insight into the speaker's personal philosophy. 
When discussing the arguments he says. "In reading or 
interpreting the world of reality. we make use of four very 
general ideas. The first three are usually expressed. in 
the language of philosophy. as being. cause. and 
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relationship. (1970. pp. 208-209)" Later he adds, "the 
rhetorician is faced with a choice of means in appealing to 
those whom he can prevail upon to listen to him. If he is 
at all philosophical. it must occur to him to ask whether 
there is a standard by which the sources of persuasion can 
be ranked" (1970. p. 211). 
The arguments used should lend insight into the 
speakers' philosophical starting points. While it would be 
difficult to pin-point a speaker's philosophical stance 
from just one speech it would not be difficult to 
hypothesize about their general philosophical inclination. 
Using some of the general philosophies covered in Donald 
Butler's Four Philosophies I will make some generalizations 
about the philosophical inclinations of each speaker from 
the arguments they use. 
BUTLER'S "FOUR PHILOSOPHIES" 
The four philosophies that will be outlined here are 
the broad categories of naturalism. idealism, realism. and 
pragmatism. I will briefly summarize the metaphysics. 
epistemology. and axiology of each philosophy along with its 
corresponding types of argument. thus providing a framework 
for speech analysis. 




Metaphysically idealism holds that we are "real 
existent beings. not transitory illusions. not dreams or 
fancies" <Butler. 1968. p. 147). Not only is the self real 
but it is either part of or the house of the soul. "The 
counterpart of the idealists' belief in the reality of self 
is his belief in the world about him •.. it is spiritual, 
made of the same stuff as self" <Butler. 1968. p. 150). The 
world around the idealist is made up of another substance 
and "is a logically related system" (Butler. 1968. p. 15 2). 
The universe contains distinctively mental realities which 
are ultimately personal. It is part of the Absolute Self 
(God?) who thinks. perceives. feels and wills" <Butler. 
1968. p. 153). 
Epistemology a 
The epistemology of idealism is like realism in that 
the "qualities we perceive in the world are rooted in 
existence of the self and that 'since nothing can be 
conceived to exist without being in relation to other 
things. many idealists believe Reality to be a logically 
unified total system, a Universal Mind'" (Butler. 1968, p. 
168). 
Axiology: 
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The axiology (value system) of idealism can be 
explained in the following propositions. Human values are 
rooted in existence. Human values are such because there 
are humans to possess and enjoy them. "Individual persons 
can realize value by actively relating parts and wholes" 
<Butler, 1968, p. 175). For instance, a person must realize 
that he is a part of the whole society in which he lives in 
order to function harmoniously within that society. 
Finally, unlike pragmatism, idealism sees value as being 
rooted in absolutes or universals. 
Arguments a 
Idealists would probably tend to use definition more 
than any other type of argument because arguments from 
definition are not unlike ideals. The idealist believes in 
first principles or absolutes, ideas who's essence is 
unchanging. Weaver (1970, p. 209) says that "Definition is 
an attempt to capture essence." When explaining the 
superiority of definition, he says that his judgement "goes 
back to a very primitive metaphysics, which holds that the 
highest reality is being [idealism], not becoming." He 
continues, "It is a quasi-religious metaphysics because it 
ascribes to the highest reality qualities of stasis, 
immutability, [and] eternal perdurance" (Weaver, 1970, p. 
209). 
Analogy would be the second choice of the idealist 
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because it hints at first principles. "Behind every analogy 
lurks the possibility of a general term" (Weaver, 1970, p. 
213). Weaver adds, "the user of analogy is hinting at an 
essence which cannot at the moment be produced." Therefore, 
the idealist prefers analogy for virtually the same 
reasons he or she prefers definition. 
Finally, the idealist would use testimony if it tended 
to be highly authoritative or traditional, e.g. The Bible, 
the Constitution, the Magna Carta, etc. 
NATURALISM 
Naturalism may be the oldest Western philosophy since 
some of the earliest figures in our history of philosophy 
were naturalists, e.g., Thales-- sixth century B.C.-- who 
decided that water was the common denominator of all 
substances <Butler, 1968, p. 49). 
Metaphysics1 
Metaphysically speaking, naturalism may be divided 
into two camps: naive and critical naturalism. "Naive 
naturalism includes all attempts to designate some one 
substance as the be-all and end-all of Nature, and therefore 
existence itself" (Butler, 1968, p. 70). This camp includes 
the materialists and the energists. Critical naturalists 
believe naive naturalism is too simplistic and prefer to 
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view the universe in terms of process rather than substance. 
Included in this camp are the positivists, who place much 
emphasis on universal laws. causes and effects <Butler. 
1968. pp. 71-72). 
Epistemology: 
Concerning knowledge (epistemology) Butler says. 
"Naturalism is a distinct philosophy by virtue of its 
insistence that reality and Nature are identical. and beyond 
that there is no reality" (Butler. 1968. p. 73). The naive 
naturalists deal with the knowledge process as an instance 
of motion. The object moves toward the knower who perceives 
it through his senses (Butler. 1968. p. 74). The critical 
naturalists exalt scientific method as the ultimate tool of 
knowledge. e.g .• Comte, Bacon's inductive reasoning. Comte 
held "that the scientific level of insight was superior to 
the theological and metaphysical because it recognized no 
substantial abiding element in reality" (Butler. 1968. p. 
76). Thus. there are no absolutes. 
Axiology: 
Naturalists hold that value is inherent in nature and 
that in order to grasp greater value one must live in 
harmony with nature (Butler. 1968, p. 79). This smacks of 
Eastern philosophy which denies a personal creator. It i s 
hedonistic in the sense that the highest good is synonymous 
with the highest pleasure. Evil is a fact of nature as well 
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as good. Naturalists do not accept what they consider man-
made or prescribed values <Butler, 1968, pp. 79-83). 
Arguments: 
Since the naturalists reject absolutes, except those 
in nature, they would tend to stay away from definition 
except in cases concerning the environment. Testimony would 
be of little use either. They would, more than likely, use 
cause-effect since they view nature as a system of causes 
and effects (Butler, 1968, p. 76). Also because cause-
effect reasoning is more scientific in method. 
Analogy might be used some since nature is full of 
analogies (i.e. fables, parables, etc.). Weaver (1970, p. 
214) says, "The cosmos [nature] is one vast system of 
analogy, so that our profoundest intuitions of it are made 
in the form of comparisons." He adds, "to affirm that 
something 
is like something else is to begin to talk about the 
unitariness of creation." Butler ( 1968, p. 73) holds that, 
"naturalism is a distinct philosophy by virtue of its 
insistence that reality and Nature are identical." 
Circumstance, a sub-variety of cause-effect, would be 
used by naturalists since the circumstances of nature 
dictate certain actions. For instance, a naturalist might 
argue that going to war in the Persian Gulf is not an option 
because of all the pollution that would be caused by the 
burning oil fields. 
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Definition would be used by the naturalist only if it 
hinted at a value or essence that were inherent in nature. 
Any human revelation would be suspect. The same would apply 
to testimony. If the testimony were scientifically proven 
or apparent in nature it would be acceptable to naturalists. 
Also, using the testimony of natural scientists, like 
astronomer Karl Sagan, would be favorable. 
REALISM 
"Naturalism builds upon the confidence most people 
have in the orderliness and dependability of Nature. 
Idealism is a comprehensive philosophy which has resulted 
from intellectualizing the common belief in the reality of 
mind and self. Correspondingly, realism is the refinement 
of our common acceptance of the world as being just what it 
appears to be" <Butler, 1968, p. 270). 
Metaphysics: 
It is difficult to find a common metaphysical theme 
running through the branches of realism. Among the sub-
groups are pluralism and determinism <Butler, 1968, pp. 
270-275). Pluralists believe in a non-unified cosmos which 
they feel liberates the human spirit. Determinists reject 
the idea of free will, arguing that the causes and effects 
of the universe dictate what is to be. Neither doubt the 
reality of existence and tend to take the world, and 
themselves at face value. 
Epistemology1 
There are two major positions dividing the 
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epistemology of realism: monism and dualism. Monism says 
that objects are "presented." not "represented." in the 
consciousness. The object that is in the knower's 
consciousness is the same object that is in the external 
world. Mind is not merely something within the brain. 
Dualists disagree. noting that "it is important to 
distinguish the object in consciousness from the combination 
of physical forces which produced that object in 
consciousness" (But 1 er • 19 6 8. p. 2 7 2) . 
Axiology1 
The two realistic theories of value are that values 
are "simple indefinable elements" which we attach worth to 
or that values depend upon the attitude of the person 
experiencing them <Butler. 1968. p. 285). George Santayana 
says values are "indefinables" which are dependent upon our 
interest in them. John Stuart Mill defined moral good as 
"the greatest happiness of the greatest number while 
protecting the few" <Butler. 1968. p. 286). This idea 
seems to favor a democratic value-system. If society 
sanctions it. it is valuable or moral. If not. it is not 
valuable. 
Arguments: 
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The argument of choice for most realists would have to 
be cause-effect because of its scientific nature and its 
pre-eminence over free-will. Butler (1968, p. 274) says. 
"realists are more commonly on the side of necessity than on 
that of freedom. Most realists hold to some form of 
determinism as a necessary alternative to the anything-can-
happen kind of world which many of them feel is implied by 
the idea of free will." They feel that the free-will of the 
individual is governed by the continual flow of causes and 
effects in the universe. Concerning the scientific nature 
of cause-effect and realism Butler (1968. p. 274) says. 
"realists are strong in their respect for the orderliness. 
accuracy, and objectivity of science ... though the world is 
a pluralism the operation of causes and effects is essential 
to its orderliness." 
Circumstance, a sub-variety of cause-effect, would 
most likely be used by realists as their decisions are based 
upon what they see. As Butler says. "realism is the 
refinement of our common acceptance of the world as being 
just what it appears to be" <1968, p. 270). 
PRAGMATISM 
Butler says that. "pragmatism builds on the intuition 
that experience is the proving ground in which the worth of 
things is made plain" (1968. p. 377). 
Metaphysicss 
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The metaphysics of pragmatism is so grounded in 
epistemology that it has been accused of having no 
metaphysics <Butler. 1968. p. 382). Butler outlines ten 
propositions concerning pragmatism's relation to the 
universe or reality (world). 
1. "The world is all foreground." The idea is that the 
background of any situation is irrelevant to the 
situation which is here and now. 
2. "The world is characterized throughout by process and 
change." 
3. "The world is precarious." It is unpredictable. 
4. "The world is incomplete and indeterminate." I t i s 
still growing and may be changed by man even though man 
is not self-determined. 
5. "The world is pluralistic." The universe is one of 
multiplicities. It is not just a universe but a multi-
universe. 
6. "The world has ends within its own process." In short. 
values are transitory experiences. 
7. "The world is not. nor does it include. a transempirical 
reality." Atheism. 
8. "Man is continuous with the world." Man is not separate 
from nature. 
9. "Man is an active cause in the world." Man. although he 
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hasn't complete free will, can influence the direction of 
events. 
10. "The world does not guarantee progress." Man must be 
involved in the world if there is to be any progress 
(Butler, 1968, pp. 382-388). 
Epistemology: 
Pragmatism is essentially an epistemological 
philosophy dealing primarily with the method of knowledge. 
Pragmatism's epistemological concern is basically "to make 
things work and so to realize their present value" <Butler, 
1968, p. 377). Experience is the frame of reference for 
everything. To the pragmatist nothing is "real" until it 
enters the realm of sense or experience. Much emphasis is 
placed on scientific method, not just for the accumulation 
of facts (Butler, 1968, pp. 380-382). 
Axiologys 
Pragmatism does not define value in any ultimate sense 
(no absolutes). Rather values exist in relation with 
individual-social activities (Butler, 1968, pp. 394-395). 
The individual (self) "is both responsible and accountable 
for what he does" in society. A pragmatist considers which 
values are desirable (both for self and the good of others) 
and then strives for consistency in value selection. Values 
are adopted from the perspective of the present situation 
which would determine the best way to resolve conflict 
<Butler, 1968, 396-397). 
Arguments: 
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Like the realist the pragmatist would be more likely 
to use cause-effect since pragmatism is interested in 
practical reality. Unlike idealism, this is a philosophy of 
becoming, not being. Weaver (1970, p. 214) asserts that 
the metaphysical ground of cause-effect is that it operates 
in the realm of becoming. Also, to the pragmatist, 
experience is everything. Causes and effects are a natural 
part of experience. As in realism and naturalism scientific 
method is exalted which, as mentioned earlier, is compatible 
with cause-effect reasoning. Finally, it was Weaver himself 
who said, "I must note that it [cause-effect] is heard most 
commonly from those who are characteristically pragmatic in 
their way of thinking" (1970, p. 214). 
CHAPTER TWO: USES OF ARGUMENT 
Arguments Outlined 
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In this chapter each of the four types of argument used 
by each of the four speakers will be identified. The 
arguments identified will be limited to the Weaverian 
hierarchy, namely: definition, analogy, cause effect, and 
testimony. These arguments will produce the material needed 
for the philosophical analysis in Chapter 3. 
Definition 
Below each speaker's use of definition will be recorded 
and explained. As Weaver (1970, p. 209) has said, "One way 
to interpret a subject is to define its nature--to describe 
the fixed features of its being. Definition is an attempt 
to capture essence ... Definitions accordingly deal with 
fundamental and unchanging properties." 
Robert Dole- Use of definition 
Senator Dole uses nine basic arguments from definition. 
Some of them are repeated but are not counted more than once 
in this analysis. Another reader might see more or less. 
For instance, my conception of argument by definition may be 
different than another's. 
#1 Senator Dole's first use of definition starts in the 
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second paragraph where he addresses the question of whether 
the Gulf situation is worth human lives being lost. He 
states the implied question. "How can you look someone in 
the eye or the parents and say. 'This is worth it?'" He 
answers. "I guess that has always been the question in any 
war." 
What Senator Dole is saying is that concerning an 
individual person one could not say. "It is worth the life 
of your husband. wife. son. daughter. etc." However. from 
an ideal standpoint. he implies that national peace. 
security. and freedom are worth fighting and dying for. 
He mentions the same later in the speech saying. "I 
don't think the time will ever come that I can look a parent 
in the eye and say. 'Well. I think it's fine: I can justify 
sending your son and risk his life anywhere in the world.'" 
While admitting reluctance he does not admit that there are 
not some things worth fighting or dying for. 
#2 He argues that military might is necessary for peace 
and that war's consequences are necessary to change 
behavior. The former is a paradox-- peace through superior 
strength--but nevertheless a universal truth in the minds of 
most. Next Senator Dole says. "Sanctions. without a credible 
military threat ... are not going to work for a long time." 
He argues that Hussein would only act correctly in the face 
of severe consequences. "The best way to have peace is for 
Saddam Hussein to clearly understand the consequences." 
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#3 Senator Dole argues from definition when he holds up 
peace as a universally desired state of humanity. Although 
he mentions peace many times, he refrains from clearly 
defining it. What he says instead are things like, "we need 
to pursue every avenue for a peaceful solution." Of Saddam 
he says, "If he wants peace he can have it." Of the 
President he says the Congress should "strengthen his hand 
for peace." His idea of peace surely includes defense but 
he, nevertheless, holds it up as an ideal. 
#4 One of Senator Dole's strongest arguments from 
definition includes the picture he draws of Saddam Hussein. 
He scornfully mentions Saddam directly or indirectly thirty-
two times in his speech emphasizing that this crisis is 
Saddam's fault. Dole characterizes him as the essence of 
evil. 
He says, "I have been a little astonished to hear some 
on this floor criticize President Bush without ever 
mentioning Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein can end this 
today. He can end it tomorrow" or "the primary message 
coming from the Congress today is to Saddam Hussein. The 
last time I checked, he was the real villain in this piece." 
Dole repeatedly emphasizes that this crisis is Hussein's 
responsibility and that it is up to him to end it or not. 
This form of definition can be contrasted with Senator 
Mitchell's speech which placed responsibility and blame on 
the President. 
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#5 Senator Dole uses argument from definition in reference 
to the President of the United States. He says. "So I hope. 
Mr. President [of the Senate]. that we are going to 
demonstrate today that the President of the United States is 
the Commander-in-Chief." In this passage he defines the 
role of the President-- "Commander in Chief." This title 
carries much weight and added meaning. Senator Dole appeals 
here to the Senate's loyalty and respect for authority 
suggesting that if they do not authorize the President to 
use force they are doing something that is not only 
contentious but disloyal. disrespectful. and unpatriotic. 
Many do not respect or fear the President. especially those 
of the opposing political party. but Senator Dole defines 
the President as one who. by nature of his office. deserves 
the respect of his peers. 
#6 Senator Dole used definition when he tried to shame his 
colleagues for their lack of a work ethic. "I said last 
November and December we ought to have been here debating 
then. when the policy was being formulated. instead of 
coming in at the eleventh hour after having been AWOL for 
three or four months ... " Here he holds up the work ethic-
something that many believe made our nation what it is- as 
an ideal and accuses his colleagues of not measuring up to 
i t • 
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#7 Definition is used when Dole appeals to the Senate's 
sense of fair play. Fair play is something sacred in 
America. We have a deep feeling that everyone should have 
opportunity to do what they want and that if they play by 
the rules they are entitled to whatever they might gain. 
When he says that the Senate should have been debating three 
or four months ago instead going AWOL and now trying to 
"change the direction of the policy President Bush has so 
patiently and successfully put together" he was saying that 
they were not being fair. 
#8 One of his strongest uses of definition is when he 
defined the nature of the conflict. He said, "This is not 
the United States versus Iraq. It is the entire 
international community with just a few exceptions versus 
Saddam Hussein and Iraq." He defines it this way to give us 
a feeling of being right and to quell the fears of any 
senators who would be reluctant to engage in any 
international conflict. 
#9 In his passionate call for unity Senator Dole again 
argues from definition. Responding to another speech he 
says, "The Senator from Illinois £Paul Simon, Democrat] just 
indicated it [the vote] is going to be closely divided. 
That is unfortunate. I wish it were not, I wish we could 
get consent." Unity is the universal here. Without it 
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little gets accomplished. United we stand, divided we fall. 
He said a unified congress would, "strengthen the 
President's hand for peace." He finishes this thought by 
saying, "if he [Saddam] draws the same conclusion as the 
Senator from Illinois has drawn, that America is divided, 
that Congress is divided, he may think he is going to get a 
free ride; he is going to be rescued, maybe, by the 
Congress." 
George Mitchell: Use of Definition 
Senator Mitchell (D, Maine) argues from definition 
eight times throughout his speech. The following paragraphs 
outline each occurrence. 
#1 Senator Mitchell uses definition when he pays homage to 
the wisdom of our country's founding fathers and their 
political masterpiece, the Constitution. He especially 
praises the wisdom of their system of checks and balances. 
He said, "The writers of our Constitution succeeded by 
creating a government with separate institutions and divided 
powers. They correctly reasoned that if power were 
sufficiently dispersed, no institution or individual could 
gain total power. Nowhere has their concept been more 
severely tested than in what they regarded as one of the 
greatest powers of government - the power to make war." 
What he is doing is lifting up a strongly held belief, at 
least in the U.S., that no one individual or group should 
Gulf War Debates 
53 
possess unlimited power. The three-fold division of power 
[exectutive, legislative, judicial] is sacrosanct in the 
U.S. 
#2 Mitchell's second use of definition comes when he seeks 
to define George Bush in a negative light e.g., a 
capricious, war-mongering president. Senator Mitchell 
mentions him directly or indirectly forty-seven times. 
He explained how the president capriciously changed his 
mind in favor of force when sanctions were beginning to take 
effect. He also accused the President of misusing his 
authority or trying to usurp authority that he didn't 
actually have. He mentioned that only Congress has the 
power to declare war and that the President needed their 
consent. He complained, "But yesterday the President said 
that, in his opinion, he needs no such authorization from 
the Congress." Later in his speech he said, "The president 
did not consult with Congress about that decision ... he just 
did it." and "In effect, the President - overnight, with no 
consultation and no public debate - changed American policy 
from ... sanctions ... into a predominantly American effort 
relying upon the use of American military force." I t i s 
easy to see that he is trying to establish George Bush as 
the villain or problem. He is not nearly as hard on Saddam. 
#3 Mitchell uses argument from definition when he defines 
the main question of the debate. "In this debate, we should 
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focus on the fundamental question before us: What is the 
wisest course of action for our nation in the Persian Gulf?" 
Whether this is the uncontested main question or not is 
immaterial. That he sought to clearly define the main 
question is. 
#4 When Mitchell says that "Iraq must fully and 
unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kuwait" he is 
defining the unanimous goal of Congress. Since this is 
believed by all involved to be the goal of the matter it 
could be considered an ideal principle. 
#5 Mitchell uses definition when he pleads for collective 
effort on the part of all affected countries. He bemoans 
the fact that this is largely a U.S. undertaking and 
believes that other nations should share more of the burden. 
He says, "Opposition to aggression is not solely an American 
value. It is universal. If there is to be war in the 
Persian Gulf, it should not be a war in which Americans do 
the fighting and dying while those who benefit from our 
effort provide token help and urge us on." 
Concerning sanctions he says, "By definition, sanctions 
require many nations to participate and share the burden." 
Mitchell feels it is inherently right to share the burden 
and use collective effort. 
#6 Mitchell puts the highest premium on human life, saying 
that it is the greatest risk in this conflict. 
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He says. 
"The risk is foremost in human life. How many people will 
die? ... That's a risk. a terrible risk. Just this morning I 
heard it said that there may be 'only' a few thousand 
casualties. But for the families of those few thousand -the 
fathers and mothers. husbands and wives. daughters and sons 
-the word 'only' will have no meaning. And the truly 
haunting question, which no one will ever be able to answer, 
will be: Did they die unnecessarily?" 
By saying this Mitchell holds up life as invaluable, 
something sacred. This constitutes definition. 
#7 When we argue by definition we are hinting at essence 
or something that is independently real or true. Mitchell 
hints at essence when he warns his fellow senators that 
their vote will have serious consequences. 
He states. "The essence of democracy is accountability 
and if immediate war occurs, that resolution. and those who 
voted for it must share that accountability." Others may 
have a different idea about what the essence of democracy 
i s . That is not the issue. The issue is that Senator 
Mitchell believes and argues that being responsible for 
one's actions. a vote in this case. is the essence of 
democracy. In doing so he argues from definition. 
#8 One thing that the use of definition should do is clear 
up uncertainties about an issue or the user's position on 
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that issue. Mitchell does this when referring to the 
President's request for authorization for the use of 
military force. He wants everybody to know that they are 
voting. in his opinion. on a resolution for "war" regardless 
of the title. 
He explains. "The President has submitted to the 
Congress a written request for authorization to use military 
force. That is the title of the resolution. In the current 
circumstances clearly it would be of such a scope and 
intensity that can only be described as war. So the second 
resolution is. plainly. by its own words and by the 
circumstances which exist in the Persian Gulf. an 
authorization for war. Of that there can be no doubt or 
dispute. That is what we will be voting for. or against. 
today." 
Senator Danforths Use of Definition 
Senator Danforth <R. Missouri) argues from definition 
nine times throughout his speech. The following paragraphs 
outline each occurrence. 
#1 Danforth said that throughout the debates two 
convictions were foremost in his mind. Concerning the first 
he says. "I am convinced beyond a doubt that the United 
States must not allow the status quo in Kuwait to stand." 
This is more a moral belief than anything. He believes that 
Iraq is wrong for occupying Kuwait and that the U.S. as the 
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remaining world power and ally of Kuwait should not allow 
i t • 
When someone comes out and says "This is wrong." they are 
taking a moral stance, thus defining. 
#2 Danforth says, "My second conviction is that - war with 
Iraq would be a disaster we should do everything to avoid. 
I have believed and I do believe that the negative 
consequences of war far outweigh the positive." Although 
the war was over relatively quickly with only a few American 
casualties, Danforth was stating his beliefs about the 
uncontrollable aspects of war. He is defining war as a 
match that has no winners. 
#3 At one point Danforth says, "We must be prepared to 
check terrifying aggression at all of its sources." Like 
the other Senators he holds the strong belief that the 
United States is a benign force in the world that has the 
means, and therefore the responsibility, to remedy gross 
injustices. He defines the Iraqi invasion as "terrifying 
aggression" and holds it up as something that is 
unacceptable in a civilized world. This defines his position 
on the invasion and the response the U.S should make. 
#4 Danforth paints a negative picture of Iraq. Referring 
to the oppressive former Soviet Union he comments that, "to 
be rid of one threat does not make the world safe." What he 
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is doing here is attempting to capture the prevailing anti-
Soviet attitudes and to attach them now to Iraq. making Iraq 
the new "Evil Empire." 
He strengthens this argument by adding the threat of 
yet another nuclear foe. He says. "A growing list of 
countries now possess or soon will possess the instruments 
of mass destruction. One of those countries is Iraq." Not 
only has he defined Iraq as the new "Evil Empire" but he has 
painted them as our next possible nuclear foe. One that is 
a lot less predictable than the Soviet Union. 
#5 Not only does Danforth define Iraq as a "brutal 
aggressor" and a threat to "the preservation of world order" 
< i . e . George Bush's "New World Order") but he also defines 
them as a threat to our vital interests. He says "what is 
involved is ... the vital economic and security interests of 
the United States and the rest of the world as well." By 
defining Iraq this way he seems to be subtly saying that the 
coalition forces ought to crush them now. not only for 
invading Kuwait but because they are a future threat to 
world's economic security. 
#6 Just as Danforth paints a scornful picture of Iraq he 
portrays the U.S as a benign world power. He says. "Would 
that there were more leaders from the free world. but the 
fact is that the United States is the leader. We are the 
one remaining world power." 
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After establishing the U.S. as the sole world power he 
places a high and idealistic responsibility on it to lead 
the fight for world order. He continues. "And if the United 
States now retreats from its commitment for a joint effort 
on the ground that others are not as strong or as firm as we 
are. all the efforts to seek Security Council resolutions 
and to consult with other governments will have been an 
exercise of futility. recognized as such throughout the 
world." This argument by definition counters Mitchell's 
definitive argument that unless there is collective effort 
there should be no effort at all. 
#7 The former Watergate offender G. Gordon Liddy wrote a 
book which pays tribute to the inner qualities of resolution 
and steadfastness. The book is simply titled "Will." In it 
he holds up the human will as that which can overcome all 
obstacles. He sees the will as man's greatest gift. I t i s 
an ideal quality. an absolute. an eternal truth. 
Danforth appeals to the will of the Congress to stand 
up against brutality. He argues. "The captain cannot 
abandon ship. Having gained the approval of so many other 
governments. some of which are on the very border of Iraq 
and in great peril for their survival. it is unthinkable 
that our Government would now lose its will." He asks the 
question that many have had to answer throughout history. 
"Do we have the will to stop this? If we don't raise a 
standard against this. who will?" 
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#8 Every civilized person recognizes that war is not the 
optimal solution of any problem. While this sentiment 
remains many recognize that it cannot always be avoided. 
Even in the helter-skelter of war the civilized world 
expects a certain restraint in conduct i.e .• civilians are 
not unnecessarily harmed. Is there an ideal war? Senator 
Danforth hints that although there is not there is an ideal 
code of ethics even in war. Realizing that the decision-
makers in Iraq can keep themselves insulated from the effect 
of the sanctions he says. "Sanctions alone will cause 
suffering to the civilian population of Iraq but they will 
not force the Iraqi army from Kuwait. And causing suffering 
to a civilian population without military results should 
never be the objective of a civilized nation." This is a 
"should" proposition based on an ideal concerning war. thus 
definition. 
#9 Danforth's ninth and final use of definition comes when 
he states that. "the key to peace is maintaining a credible 
military threat." This is a statement of conservative 
ideology. It is like saying. "We need an armed police force 
to protect our citizens" or "We need harsh laws against 
drunk drivers to keep our streets safe." On the other hand. 
the liberal ideal is that we will never have peace until we 
get rid of all our bombs. 
Senator Danforth recognizes the apparent irony of what 
he says and explains his position further: "It is indeed a 
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supreme irony that it is only through the threat of force 
that a stable world can be maintained. But that is an irony 
we have recognized ever since World War II." Again. he is 
expressing an ideal concerning war and peace. In doing so 
he is using definition. 
Senator Nunn: Use of Definition 
The speech by Senator Nunn CD. Georgia) contained only 
six apparent arguments by definition. the least of all the 
speeches. 
#1 Nunn begins his speech by addressing how ironic it seemed 
that the foreign minister of Iraq refused to accept a letter 
from President Bush because he didn't think it would be 
polite. He said. "I find that Iraqi protest both ironic 
and. indeed. repulsive." What he found repulsive was that a 
country that seems to care so little about the laws of 
civility and humanity could be so concerned about the 
niceties of etiquette. 
He asks sarcastically. "Was it polite when Saddam 
Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people? And 
then. again. against Iran? Was it polite when Iraqi forces 
launched a brutal. unprovoked invasion of Kuwait? Was it 
polite when Iraqi forces used savage violence against 
innocent Kuwaiti civilians and took hostage innocent 
foreigners residing in that country?" He uses definition 
here by showing the negative example of the Iraqis 
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concerning civility. Civility is the ideal. Politeness was 
an effective contrast. 
#2 Nunn's second use of definition came when he sought to 
clarify exactly what President Bush was asking for in his 
request. He wanted to make sure there was no question in 
his colleague's minds as to what they will be voting on. He 
defined it as war, plain and simple. 
He states, "There are many gray areas where the 
Congress, by necessity, has permitted and even encouraged 
and supported military action by the Commander-in-Chief 
without specific authorization and without a declaration of 
war. I do not deem every military action taken as war. I 
think there is always room for debate on definitions. But a 
war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait initiated by the United 
States and involving over 400,000 American forces is not a 
gray area." 
#3 Senator Nunn quotes the Constitution more than once. 
When quoting it should be considered testimony but when he 
lauds the wisdom behind it he uses definition. He 
understands that many see the wisdom of the Constitution as 
an almost unchanging property or value. That is why so many 
Americans, especially politicians, refer to it. 
He says, "It is essential, to comply with the 
Constitution and to commit the Nation, that Congress give 
its consent before the President initiates a large-scale 
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military offensive against Iraq. I think the Founding 
Fathers had a great deal of wisdom when they put this 
provision in the Constitution." He holds forth the wisdom 
of the Founding Fathers for our age to respect and emulate. 
This is a form of argument by definition. 
#4 Nunn's fourth occurrence of argument by definition 
comes when he again seeks to define a single concept. This 
time he goes after the word "vital." Suggesting that his 
fellow Congressmen should think before they call something 
vital he says. "When we talk about the question of vital - a 
lot oftimes we in Washington throw that word around as if 
it's just another word." To illustrate his point he refers 
to the "vital" interests we had in Lebanon that we abandoned 
once the marines were killed. 
Nunn's definition of vital is different from just 
merely something important. He explains. "A lot of things 
are important. very important. than aren't vital. Vital in 
the sense of young men and young women being called to put 
their lives on the line." Afterwards he places a 
responsibility upon his colleagues to define the situation 
properly. He says. "We have an obligation as leaders to 
distinguish between important interests which are worthy of 
economic. political. and diplomatic efforts and interests 
that are vital. that are worth the calling by the leaders of 
this Nation on our young men and women in uniform to 
sacrifice. if necessary. their lives." 
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#5 The theme that runs throughout Nunn's speech is that 
war should be the last resort. He defines war as harshly as 
he can. He repeatedly tells his colleagues of the ugliness 
of war and the cost of it in human lives. Quoting the 
former Admiral Crowe to make his point he says. "War is not 
neat. not tidy: once you resort to it. war is uncertain and 
a mess." Although he makes much of this argument through 
cause-effect he is using definition when he paints a picture 
of war as the most undesirable of human endeavors. 
#6 Finally Senator Nunn asks his colleagues to answer the 
"fundamental question" of the conflict. The question to him 
is the ultimate question of the debate. That is why he 
closes with it. By asking it he requires his colleagues not 
only to tally the score and weigh all the pros and cons but 
to be truthful with themselves and to search their souls. 
He asks the Senators to ask themselves. "will I be able 
to look at the parents. wives. the husbands. and children in 
the eye and say their loved ones sacrificed their lives for 
a cause vital to the United States. and that there was no 
other reasonable alternative?" This is the ultimate question 
in his mind. By defining the ultimate question of value he 
is arguing by definition. 
ANALOGY (SIMILITUDE) 
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The next form of argument in Weaver's hierarchy is 
analogy or similitude. He says, "We make use of analogy or 
comparison when the available knowledge of the subject 
permits only probable proof. Analogy is reasoning from 
something we know to something we do not know in one step; 
hence there is no universal ground for predication. Yet 
behind every analogy lurks the possibility of a general term 
(definition)." Later he says, "The user of analogy is 
hinting at an essence which cannot at the moment be 
produced. Or, he may be using an indirect approach for 
reason of tact; analogies not infrequently do lead to 
generalizations; and he may be employing this approach 
because he is respectful of his audience and desires them to 
use their insight" (1970, p.213). 
Analogy is, then, simply comparing one thing or event 
to another in order to hint at a greater reality or to 
solidify a likeness or relationship. The following sections 
will outline the use of analogy by the four Senators. 
Robert Dole: Use of Analogy 
Senator Dole uses analogy well and uses it more than 
any of the four Senators. The eight instances will be 
identified in the following paragraphs. 
#1 A. "Holiday" for Saddam 
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At the time of this speech the January 15 deadline had 
been set for Iraq to leave Kuwait. Dole argued that if the 
President had not been given permission to use force the 
deadline would mean nothing. The resolution before them at 
the time required that more time should be given to let the 
sanctions work. Dole argues, "it (the pro-sanctions 
resolution] actually gives Saddam Hussein a holiday from the 
threat that we might use force, if I tell you well, on 
January 15 we are going to let sanctions work some 
interminable length of time - not six months." He added 
that if Saddam were given this "holiday" he would use it to 
dig in deeper and inflict more casualties upon our forces. 
By comparing the pro-sanctions resolution to a "holiday," he 
illustrates its weakness. 
li .::A two-edged sword" 
The pro-sanctions resolution that he referred to as a 
"holiday" for Saddam he also refers to as a "two-edged 
sword." He calls it a two-edged sword because while it may 
negatively affect Iraq it will give them more time to dig in 
making them more dangerous. It could backfire. 
#3 "A.W.O.L." 
Chiding the Senate for trying to subvert the 
President's policy at the last minute he charges, "I said 
last November and December we ought to have been here 
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debating then when the policy was being formulated instead 
of coming in at the eleventh hour after having been AWOL for 
three or four months and try to change the direction of the 
policy President Bush has so patiently and successfully put 
together." The "A.W.O.L." (absent without leave) analogy 
denounces a partisan and lackadaisical Congress. comparing 
them to a soldier who deserts his unit. 
#4 Pulling the!..!!.&.. out! 
Asking the Senate to back the President in order to 
show solidarity he pleads. "Let us not pull the rug out from 
under the President at this last moment. at the eleventh 
hour. when the pressure is building on Saddam Hussein by the 
minute." By using the rug analogy he suggests that a vote 
against authorization is at best disloyal and at worst a 
dirty trick. 
li A. "hunting license" 
Although Dole wants to authorize the President's option 
to use force he does not intend it to be a ticket to carry 
out a personal vendetta. He explains, "I want our President 
to understand this is not some hunting license. that this is 
to strengthen his hand for peace. not war but for peace." 
#6 ::..A blank check" 
Referring to the granting of authorization to use force 
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he explains. "this is not a blank check" and adds, "I intend 
to use my influence ... in every way that I can to find some 
peaceful way to resolve the current crisis." As in the 
"hunting license" illustration he is trying to assure his 
fellow Senators that a vote for authorization does not mean 
that President Bush will be able to act capriciously. 
ll :A free ride" 
Senator Dole suggests that a divided Congress will 
signify to Saddam Hussein that we will not have enough 
solidarity to thwart him. He. after all. was hoping this 
would turn out to be another Viet Nam. He says. "if he 
[Hussein] draws the same conclusion as the Senator from 
Illinois [Paul Simon, Democrat] has drawn. that America is 
divided. that Congress is divided. he may think he is going 
to get a free ride." This analogy is appropriate for 
Congress since giving Saddam a "free ride" is the last thing 
they want to appear to be doing. 
#8 "An anchor" 
Dole's last analogy is a play on words. He states that 
if Saddam thinks Congress is divided that maybe he will be 
off the hook. He says that maybe Saddam thinks that. "he is 
going to be rescued, maybe. by the Congressi we are going to 
throw him an anchor. But if we throw him one. I want it to 
go down." 
Senator Mitchella Use of analogy 
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Mitchell's initial focus in his speech was the balance 
between the power of the President and Congress concerning 
the power to go to war. He says. "The Constitution 
designates the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces. With that designation comes the authority to 
direct the deployment of those forces. But the 
Constitution also grants to the Congress the authority to 
raise and support armies and to declare war." 
His point is that he believed that President Bush was 
over-stepping his boundaries when he was posturing to use 
force without consulting Congress. 
#2 :A blank check" 
Mitchell. wanting to drive home how serious the 
resolution is. warned that to give President Bush permission 
to use force would be like giving him a "blank check" to 
initiate war. He says. "In its simplest form. the question 
is whether Congress will give the President an unlimited 
blank check to initiate war." 
John C. Danfortha Use of Analogy 
ll A.. New Threat 
Danforth recalls history and points out that the Soviet 
Union is not now the threat it once used to be. Yet. he 
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emphasizes. that does not necessarily make the world a safe 
place. He says. "This is the first major test of the post-
cold-war order ... the great threat we have feared since 1945 
is no longer real ... But the events of August 2 have 
demonstrated to all that to be rid of one threat does not 
make the world safe." He goes on to detail Iraq's arsenal 
of mass destruction and urges the U.S. not to let its guard 
down because the Soviets are no longer a threat. 
#2 "Oi 1" and "Oxygen" 
Danforth compares oil to oxygen when defending oil as a 
vital security interest. He says. "Some people have asked 
whether this conflict is not 'just about' oil. To me. that 
is like asking whether it is not just about oxygen. Like it 
or not. our country. together with the rest of the world. is 
utterly dependent on oil." 
li "The World's Policeman" 
Danforth does not actually call the U.S. "the world's 
policeman" but rather defends against that accusation. He 
uses this analogy to show how President Bush skillfully and 
patiently put together a coalition of countries for 
multilateral action. 
He says. "many ... especially liberal commentators. have 
argued that the United States should not go it alone in the 
world. We should not take it upon ourselves to be the 
world's policeman ... We should address crises on a 
Gulf War Debates 
71 
multilateral basis." He answers the accusation by detailing 
how President Bush repeatedly went to the U.N. Security 
Council for approval. how James Baker had been all over the 
world consulting. and how through these efforts the 
President had garnered the support of more than twenty 
nations. 
#4 "The captain cannot abandon the ship" 
This analogy comes in response to the argument set 
forth by Senator Mitchell that is unfair that the U.S. has 
had to put forth more money and troops than other nations 
have. He says. in effect. now that we are choosing 
multilateral action over unilateral action the opposition is 
still not happy because we have to put up higher stakes. He 
sarcastically asks if we shouldn't just scuttle the whole 
idea of multilateralism. He chides the opposition telling 
them that they can't have it both ways. 
The analogy reads. "The captain cannot abandon the 
ship. Having gained the approval of so many other 
governments. some of which are on the very border of Iraq 
and in great peril for their survival. it is unthinkable 
that our Government would now lose its will." 
Sam Nunn1 Use of Analogy 
!1. 1..§_ brutality polite? 
Although Senator Nunn's "politeness" contrast is found 
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in the definition section it is also fitting to call it an 
analogy. In this case it is a sarcastic analogy. He 
marveled at the Iraqi Ambassador's refusal to accept 
President Bush's letter to Saddam on the grounds that it 
probably would not be "polite." He asked whether the 
ambassador thought it was polite when Saddam used chemical 
weapons against Iran or his own people, whether it was 
polite when he invaded Kuwait, committed savage acts of 
violence against its people, and took foreigners hostage? 
#2 Lebanon s.!.. a vital interest 
In the definition section I outlined how Nunn 
painstakingly defined the word "vital." In that same breath 
he used an analogy to point out that Kuwait is not really 
vital to U.S. interests. He said, "I recall very clearly 
President Reagan's 1982 declaration that Lebanon was vital 
to the security of the United States. Shortly thereafter, 
following the tragic death of more than 200 marines, we 
pulled out of Lebanon, we pulled out of a country that not 
only a few weeks before had been declared vital." 
Nunn disagreed with the Bush Administration's 
interpretation of the CIA report on the Iraq situation. The 
White House jumped on the fact that the CIA could not 
guarantee that sanctions would indeed drive Iraq out of 
Kuwait. Nunn countered, "I haven't seen any guarantees on 
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any subject from the Intelligence Community. It's not their 
fault. They're not in the business of guaranteeing. The 
CIA is not the FDIC. They give you the facts, then you use 
common sense to come to conclusions." 
#4 Fast food or Vietnam 
While discussing the possibilities of a confrontation 
Nunn seems sure that it would not be another Vietnam nor 
should we use the same politically motivated strategy which 
proved so devastating to our forces. He warns however not 
to expect results too quickly. He says, "we should not 
'over learn' the Vietnam lesson. We in America like instant 
results. We want fast food and we want fast military 
victories. However, our Nation places a much higher value 
on human life ... we must avoid an 'instant victory' kind of 
psychology with demands and expectations in this country 
that could cause a premature and high casualty assault on 
heavily fortified Kuwait by American ground forces." 
CAUSE/EFFECT 
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Weaver (1971) says. "another way to interpret a subject 
is to place it in a cause-and-effect relationship. The 
process of interpretation is then to affirm it as the cause 
of some effect or as the effect of some cause. And the 
attitudes of those who are listening will be affected 
according to whether or not they agree with our cause-and-
effect analysis" (p. 209). The reason cause/effect 
reasoning is ranked lower on Weaver's hierarchy is its lack 
of a philosophical basis. However. cause/effect reasoning 
is a vital part of any issue. The point is that overuse of 
cause/effect demonstrates a lack of philosophical depth. 
Although no Senator used more than six distinct 
cause\effect arguments it should be noted that they repeat 
many of these arguments several times during their speeches. 
Robert Doles Cause/effect reasoning 
#1 Senator Dole states at the beginning of his speech 
that. "Sanctions. without a credible military threat. in my 
view. are not going to work for a long time." This is the 
thesis of his speech and the crux of the whole debate. It 
is repeated throughout the whole speech. Lack of support 
for use of force by Congress would cause an effect of 
strengthening Iraq's position. 
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#2 Dole said he had heard that "Saddam Hussein was waiting 
for the Senate vote" and that a vote against force would 
indicate that he would get "a little holiday." The cause 
being a no-force vote, the effect, more time for Saddam to 
fortify his position. Speaking of the Nunn resolution (no-
force) he says, "I happen to believe that the resolution we 
are about to vote on does exactly the wrong thing. As I 
have indicated, it actually gives Saddam Hussein a holiday 
from the threat that we might use force." He later outlines 
the effect, "He (Saddam) probably would not just take the 
holiday; he would probably dig in deeper and make 
preparations so he could inflict even more casualties on the 
United States and on our young men ... " 
#3 When Dole says, "I hope ... that we are going to 
demonstrate today that the President of the United States is 
the Commander-in-Chief." he is saying that a vote for force 
will send a message to Iraq that our President is indeed our 
spokesman and that he has the authority to back up what he 
says. 
#4 The Senator offers up the essence of the whole 
cause/effect question when he says, "I am not certain any of 
us can predict with certainty, if there should be a 
conflict, how many lives would be lost, how much of a cost, 
how long it would last." He then states his belief that 
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"our best chance for peace is to strengthen the President's 
had in every way that we can." A vote for force would be 
the cause and peace would be the probable result as 
contradictory as that may seem. 
George Mitchell: Cause/effect 
#1 Senator Mitchell starts by giving a description of the 
checks and balances built into our system especially 
concerning the power to make war. Then he states that "the 
question is whether Congress will give the President an 
unlimited blank check to initiate war against Iraq." The 
cause here would be a pro-force vote. The implied result 
would be placing a dangerous amount of power in the hands of 
one man. 
#2 Mitchell points out yet another cause/effect sequence 
concerning fairness. He states, "Americans now make up more 
than three-fourths of the fighting forces in the region," 
and asks "Why should it be an American war, made up largely 
of American troops, American casualties, and American 
deaths?" The cause here is America's leadership role in the 
fight creating the effect of a disproportionate amount of 
American deaths. 
#3 One of the most lengthy portions of the Senator's 
speech was where he argued, quoting the Bush Administration, 
the CIA, etc., that sanctions (the cause) were working and 
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putting an unbearable burden on Iraq (the effect). He 
mentioned the virtual cut-off of Iraqi exports. the decline 
in their GNP, their industry (esp. military hardware), oil 
reserves, food reserves, agricultural production, etc. This 
cause/effect sequence covers over a full page of text making 
it one of his major arguments. 
#4 Mitchell does briefly mention the risks of using only 
continued sanctions. The time needed for continued world-
wide sanctions (cause) may prove to be the undoing of the 
international coalition (effect). While acknowledging this 
risk he reiterates that the risk of war (cause) and the 
potential loss of American lives (effect) is greater. 
#5 He states that war would cause "a greatly disrupted 
oil-supply and oil price increases." 
#6 He argued that a war that included Israel, Turkey or 
other allies would result in long-term American occupation, 
less stability in the Middle-East, and Arab enmity against 
the U.S. 
John Danforth1 Cause/effect 
#1 Senator Danforth's first cause/effect sequence brought 
in the issue of world peace. He said. "The events of August 
2 have demonstrated to all that to be rid of one threat does 
not make the world safe. A growing list of countries now 
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possess or soon will possess the instruments of mass 
destruction. One of those countries is Iraq." The idea 
being that inaction on the part of the U.S. may result in a 
threat to world peace. 
#2 Danforth was concerned that Iraq, which now has 
approximately 20$ of the world's oil reserves, could gain 
another 25$ by conquest of Saudi Arabia if our force was not 
used. In other words a no-force vote (cause) could mean 
that a mad-man would control nearly half the world's oil 
reserves. He argued that we are utterly dependent on oil 
whether we like it or not and Saddam could have huge impact 
on our economy. 
#3 Danforth was concerned about the future of 
international cooperative efforts. He said, "if the United 
States now retreats from its commitment for a joint effort 
on the ground that others are not as strong or as firm as we 
are, all the efforts to seek Security Council resolutions 
and to consult with other governments will have been an 
exercise of futility, recognized as such throughout the 
world." In other words, if the U.S. backs out because the 
other allied nations cannot provide as much force (cause) 
the future of international cooperation in matters such as 
these is in jeopardy (effect). 
#4 Danforth took time to recognize the negative effects of 
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war with Iraq. He named Middle-East instability as one of 
the most severe consequences. However, he decides, 
"Sanctions alone will cause suffering to the civilian 
population of Iraq but they will not force the Iraqi Army 
from Kuwait." 
#5 Danforth did not feel that time was on our side. He 
questioned whether troops could maintain high levels of 
readiness if kept in the desert for another nine or so 
months, the support of the American public, or the Muslim 
acceptance of their presence. Time is the cause, lack of 
readiness, support from home, and Muslim resentment are the 
implied effects. 
Sam Nunna Cause/effect reasoning 
#1 Senator Nunn felt that sanctions could be very 
effective. He noted how the Iraqi economy is based on oil 
which accounts for nearly 50% of its GNP and nearly 100% of 
its hard currency. Cut off oil (cause) and disable their 
economy (effect). 
#2 Nunn quoted Admiral Crowe as saying that war is an 
uncertain mess and added that, "the additional cost to 
Kuwait of letting sanctions work must be weighed against the 
cost to Kuwait in terms of human lives, human suffering, as 
well as national resources, if the U.S.-led coalition 
launches a military offensive to liberate a country which is 
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heavily fortified." In his mind sanctions (cause) and their 
risks (effect) are better than a military strike (cause) and 
its risks both to Kuwait and the U.S. forces. 
#3 Another effect of war with Iraq is Mid-East 
instability. Nunn says, "Considering the wave of Islamic 
reaction, anti-Americanism and terrorism that is likely to 
be unleashed by a highly destructive war with many Arab 
casualties, it is difficult to conceive of the Middle East 
as a more stable region where Americans will be safe." 
#4 Finally Nunn considers the possibility of a vote for 
force and an ensuing battle. He didn't think it would be a 
long war like Vietnam. However he warned of the possible 
effects of a "quick victory mentality" (cause) and the cost 
in lives. 
TESTIMONY 
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Testimony is simply the citation of a source other than 
one's self, usually an expert. As Weaver (1970, pp. 209-
210) says, "If we are not in position to see or examine, but 
can procure the deposition of someone who is, the deposition 
may become the substance of our argument." 
Bob Doles Use of testimony 
* Senator Dole did not use testimony in his speech * 
George Mitchell1 Use of testimony 
#1 Senator Mitchell cited one of the earliest drafts of 
the Constitution to expound on exactly who's job it was to 
declare war. He said "The earliest draft of the 
Constitution would have empowered the Congress to 'make 
war,' a greater grant of power than to 'declare war.'" 
#2 On several occasions Mitchell quoted the President to 
demonstrate that the sanctions were indeed working. One 
example is when George Bush said, " ... these sanctions are 
working. Iraq is feeling the heat ... Iraq's leaders ... are 
cut off from world trade, unable to sell their oil, and only 
a tiny fraction of goods get through." 
Gulf War Debates 
82 
#3 He quotes Secretary of State Baker as saying, " ... we 
must exercise patience as the grip of sanctions tightens 
with increasing severity." 
#4 He quotes CIA Director William Webster as saying, 
" ... all sectors of the Iraqi economy are feeling the pinch 
of sanctions, and many industries have largely shut down." 
Later he lists the effects Webster said that the sanctions 
were having on Iraq. 
John Danforth: Use of Testimony 
#1 Senator Danforth leaned heavily on the testimony of CIA 
Director William Webster. In fact he asked that a 
transcript of Webster's testimony be printed in the 
Congressional Record. After the initial testimony he cited 
portions of it three different times to make the point that 
sanctions alone would not be enough. 
Sam Nunn: Use of Testiaony 
#1 Senator Nunn cites Article 1, Section 8 of the 
Constitution to demonstrate that it is Congress, not the 
president who has the power to commit the nation to war. 
#2 Nunn did not think that Kuwait was "vital" to our 
national security and uses Ronald Reagan's words to 
demonstrate how Lebanon was "vital" before the 200 marines 
were killed and not so vital afterward. He noted that it 
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was a contradiction to call it vital one day and pull out 
shortly thereafter. 
#3 He cites former Secretary of Defense and former CIA 
Director James Schlesinger as saying, " ... the investment of 
the prestige of the President of the United States now makes 
it vital (he does not use the word 'vital' lightly) for Iraq 
to withdraw from Kuwait. I do not think that it is 
necessary, to achieve that objective, for us to turn to war. 
I think that we can avoid war and still achieve the 
objective of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait." 
#4 In defense of continued sanctions he quotes President 
Bush as saying, "Economic sanctions, in this instance, if 
fully enforced, can be very, very effective ... and nobody can 
stand up forever to total economic deprivation." 
#5 Again, in defense of sanctions he quotes Dr. Gary 
Hufbauer, Georgetown specialist on economic sanctions, as 
saying, "Never have they (sanctions) imposed such enormous 
costs on the target country ... Iraq's economy ... is far more 
vulnerable to economic coercion than other economies ... " 
#6 Concerning the stability of the international coalition 
he quotes Admiral William Crowe as saying, "It is hard to 
understand why some consider our international alliance 
strong enough to conduct intense hostilities, but too 
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fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful 
solution." 
#7 He again quotes Admiral Crowe. "War is not neat. not 
tidy; once you resort to it. war is uncertain and a mess." 
#8 He claimed that CIA Director Webster's testimony 
confirmed that if the sanctions were kept in place for six 
to twelve months Iraq's air and ground defenses would be 
seriously degraded. 
#9 Finally he quotes General Norman Schwarzkopf three 
times to demonstrate that continued sanctions are a better 
alternative than force. Schwarzkopf said. "If the 
alternative to dying is sitting out in the sun for another 
summer. then that's not a bad alternative." 
SUMMARY 
The number and types of arguments each Senator used has 
now been detailed. Chapter three will consist of a 
philosophical analysis of the arguments. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS 
While Chapter 2 detailed each speaker's use of the four 
types of argument this chapter will analyze their use of 
argument to identify their philosophical inclination. Each 
speaker will be analyzed according to their use of 
definition, analogy, and cause-effect which are easily 
ranked in Weaver's hierarchy. Testimony can produce the 
best or worst of arguments depending upon who is cited 
(Weaver, 1970, p.209). Therefore, arguments from testimony 
will be analyzed qualitatively even though their totals 
appear on the table. 
RESULTS 
--------~DEFINITION ____ ~ANALOGY ____ CAUSE-EFFECT ____ TESTIMONY 
DOLE _____ _ 9 8 4 0 
MITCHELL ____ _ 8 2 6 4 
DANFORTH ____ __ 9 4 5 1 
NUNN _____ _ 6 4 4 9 
figure No. 1 
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As shown Senators Dole and Danforth led in argument by 
definition with 9, Mitchell had 8, and Nunn had 6. Dole led 
in use of analogy with 8 arguments, while Danforth and Nunn 
had 4, and Mitchell had 2. Mitchell led in the use of 
cause/effect argument with 6 while Danforth used 5, and Dole 
and Nunn used 4 each. In use of testimony Senator Nunn 
cited 9 sources, Mitchell 4, Danforth 1, and Dole 0. 
It was established in the methodology section that 
Weaver placed the highest value on argument by definition 
because it seeks to offer unchanging essences which is more 
perfect than that which has to change. He says, 
"Stipulative definitions are of the ideal, and in this fact 
lies the reason for placing them at the top of the 
hierarchy. If the real progress of man is toward knowledge 
of ideal truth, it follows that this is an appeal to his 
highest capacity--his capacity to apprehend what exists 
absolutely" (1970, p.213). 
Since Senators Dole and Danforth led in this category 
with 9 arguments from definition apiece, they must be 
considered the most idealistic in their philosophical 
inclination and thus rate very high on Weaver's hierarchy. 
Senator Mitchell also ranked high in this category with 
8 and Senator Nunn was the least idealistic of all with 6. 
The pro-forces senators had a combined total of 18 
uses of definition while the anti-force senators usage 
totaled 14. This may indicate that by the use of definition 
Gulf War Debates 
87 
alone Weaver himself may have taken the pro-force side. 
ANALOGY 
Next on Weaver's hierarchy is analogy (similitude) 
because "behind every analogy lurks the possibility of a 
general term" (Weaver. 1970. p. 213). He feels that the 
user of analogy is hinting at an essence which is not 
readily available. This is closer to the ideal. However. 
analogies referring to nature can be considered 
naturalistic. 
Dole used 8 analogies. which is twice as many as the 
next closest senator. two of which could be considered 
naturalistic analogies. Senators Nunn and Danforth both 
offered a modest use of analogy with 4. Danforth used 1 
natural analogy. Mitchell used only 2 analogies in his 
whole speech. Considering only use of analogy Dole would 
rate the highest by Weaver's standards and the pro-force 
speakers <Dole and Danforth) with their combined total of 
12 analogies would rate significantly higher than the anti-
force speakers (Nunn and Mitchell) who had 6. This 
indicates that Dole is more idealistic than either Danforth 
or Nunn and that Mitchell is the least idealistic of all. 
CAUSE-EFFECT 
Weaver found cause-effect argumentation to be used 
mostly by those of a pragmatic nature. He disdained 
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argument exclusively based on consequence without reference 
to principle or defined ideas. He felt that this argument 
tends to be sensational and is used to play upon the fears 
of an audience (Weaver, 1970, p. 214-215). Cause-effect 
thus ranks lower than all arguments except extremely poor 
use of testimony. 
Senator Mitchell led in his use of cause-effect 
argument with 6, making him the most realistic/pragmatic 
while Danforth had 5 and Dole and Nunn 4. The pro-force 
speakers and anti-force speakers were almost even in their 
combined use of cause-effect argument (pro-force 9, anti-
force 10). Mitchell and Nunn were the only ones to mention 
natural resources and the effects war could have on them. 
However, each only mention it once. 
TESTIMONY 
Although testimony was listed last, it is not 
necessarily the weakest argument. The strength of testimony 
comes from its source. "The sound maxim is that an argument 
based on authority is as good as the authority" (Weaver, 
1970, p. 216). 
Senator Nunn was the undisputed leader in use of 
testimony with 9. The next closest was Mitchell with 4. 
Danforth had 1 and Dole had 0. In the methodology section I 
identified idealists, realists, and pragmatists as being the 
chief users of testimony. Idealists use it only when it is 
spiritual, authoritative, or historical. Realists and 
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pragmatists use it when they have a field expert available. 
While Dole did not use testimony the other three Senators 
leaned toward realism-pragmatism. There were only two uses 
of testimony of an idealistic nature. both Nunn and Mitchell 
cited the Constitution once. There were no citations of a 
naturalistic kind. and the rest were from the president. 
Secretary of State. the CIA director. and other experts and 
authorities on war. However, the lack of testimony in the 
pro-force speakers might suggest a naturalist tendency. 
Naturalists believe that value is inherent in nature and 
reject prescribed values. and thus would have little use of 
the testimony of man or other revered sources. 
PHILOSOPHICAL INCLINATION 
Senator Dole 
In view of Senator Dole's 9 to 4 ratio of definition 
to cause-effect and his 8 to 4 ratio of analogy to 
cause/effect it is safe to say that he has an idealistic 
philosophical inclination. Since he used 4 sequences of 
cause/effect reasoning he still is somewhat pragmatic and 
realistic yet not as much as the other senators. Again, his 
lack of testimony may suggest a touch of naturalistic 
tendency. 
Senator Mitchell 
Mitchell's ratio of definition to cause-effect was 4 
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to 3 while his analogy to cause-effect ratio was only 1 to 
3. While he was more idealist that anything he could be 
considered less idealistic than the pro-force senators. His 
heavy use of cause-effect argumentation coupled with his use 
of testimony which consisted largely of quoting contemporary 
political figures signifies strong leanings toward realism 
and pragmatism. His use of testimony consists of quoting 
the Constitution and the President as well as citing the 
Secretary of State and CIA Director William Webster. The 
first two uses could be considered idealistic, the next two 
could be considered realistic/pragmatic so there is no 
strong leaning to one or the other. 
Senator Danforth 
Senator Danforth's 9 to 5 definition to cause-effect 
ratio shows him to be nearly as skewed toward idealism as 
Dole but his analogy to cause-effect ratio is considerably 
weaker (4 to 5). He used one naturalistic analogy when he 
spoke of "oil" and "water" but not enough to qualify him as 
naturalistic. However, his lack of argument from testimony 
may also point toward naturalism. His use of cause-effect 
arguments showed that he also had inclinations toward 
pragmatism and realism. More than Nunn and Dole yet less 
than Mitchell. His one use of testimony came when he asked 
that the letter submitted to the intelligence committee from 
CIA Director William Webster be included in the record of 
his speech. The letter was purely cause-effect 
observation. 
Senator Nunn 
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Senator Nunn was the least idealistic of all yet his 
definition to cause-effect ratio was 3 to 2 and his analogy 
to cause-effect ratio was 1 to 1. He was more idealistic 
than anything else yet not by much. He showed no sign of 
being naturalistic in his use of analogy or testimony but 
did show signs of realism/pragmatism when he mentioned that 
he would fully back a pro-force vote should the pro-force 
side prevail. Realism tends toward a democratic morality. 
He, like the rest, also has some leanings toward pragmatism. 
Although he used less cause/effect arguments than Mitchell 
and Danforth his cause/effect ratio to both definition and 
analogy is greater. He used much more testimony than any of 
the other speakers. He, like Mitchell, cited the 
Constitution once but mostly relied on contemporary war 
experts and political figures. Nothing that would make him 
seem more idealistic. 
Weaverian Scales 
Applying a value of 3 points to each use of 
definition, 2 for analogy, and 1 for cause-effect produces 
the following results. Dole scored highest by Weaverian 
standards with 47, Danforth next with 40, then Mitchell with 
34, and Nunn with 30. Pro-forces Senators combined had 87 
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compared to 64 for pro-sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated in the hypothesis Richard Weaver's hierarchy 
of argument does indeed provide a useful framework for the 
identification of arguments. It was also hypothesized that 
the arguments would prove useful in identifying the 
speakers' philosophical inclinations. In a purely 
quantitative sense this cannot be proven, however, this 
was a qualitative endeavor. The results show that each 
speaker employed a few of each of the selected types of 
arguments. Their use of argument helped identify their 
leanings toward idealism, pragmatism, and realism but little 
pointed toward naturalism. It was admittedly difficult to 
identify a particular cause-effect argument as pragmatic, 
realistic, or naturalistic. Any further research along 
these lines would be best served by reducing or simplifying 
the range of philosophical starting points. It would be 
easier to identify a speaker as either idealistic or 
pragmatic rather than to try to identify them as 
naturalistic or realistic at the same time. 
All speakers used a mixture of arguments, however it 
may be significant that the pro-force senators used more 
definition than the pro-sanctions senators (18-14). They 
also used more analogy (10-6). Cause-effect usage was 
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nearly equal (pro-force 9, pro-sanctions 10). The pro-
sanctions senators used significantly more testimony than 
the pro-force senators (13-1). This could mean that the 
pro-sanction senators were better researched or that they 
depend more upon external sources for their information. 
Some areas of research that can follow from this study 
might be a language study of the Persian Gulf Debates or a 
study of war rhetoric. Further study concerning 
philosophical inclination as it relates to use of argument 
should seek to reduce the variables of philosophy. 
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The Persian Gulf Crisis 
By ROBERT DOLE, U.S. Senator from Kansas 
Delivered to the Senate, Washington, D.C., January 12, 1991 
MR. President, we are going to be voting here in just a few minutes. I want to say, first, I think it is an 
honor and privilege for me to follow the distin-
guished Senator from Hawaii in this debate. He talked about 
his generation, and I am part of that generation. In fact, the 
two of us spent about 3 years together in Battle Creek, Ml, in 
Percy Jones Hospital He was one of the greatest patients of 
all time, as I recall. 
Also there as a paticntwas our late distinguished friend, former 
Senator Phil Hart. So I guess when you ask the question how can 
~u look someone in the eye or the parents and sa~ "This is worth 
11," I guess that has always been a question in any war. 
To some of us, we see it differently. San_ctions, without a 
credible military threat, in my.view, arc.not going_to_work for 
a_Iong time. But it also seems to some of us that the best way 
to have peace is for Saddam Hussein to clearly understand the 
consequences. 
Someone sent me a note yesterday saying that they had it on 
very credible authority that Saddam Hussein was waiting for 
the_ ~ena~c vote. He still had some hope that he would prevail, 
not that anybody wants hi_mt6 prevail, but that the outcome 
":ould mean to him he was going to have a I ittle holiday. Nobody 
knows how long the holiday would be because there is not any 
deadline in the Nunn holiday resolution. It is not 1day,3 days, 
3 months, 3 vears. · 
I think ev;ryone would agree that Si!nctions without a cred-
ible military threat would never have any severe impact on Iraq 
or Saddam Hussein. . 
I have said to the President of the United States in a meet-
ing with Republicans and Democrats that we need to pursue 
every avenue for peaceful solution •. 
I have said to the President of the United States, when I 
look into the eyes of a young man in the desert in Saudi Arabia 
I see his parents, maybe his children, his spouse, and if we talk 
about burden sharing as we have in the dollar terms, when do 
we start counting the deaths; how many Egyptians? How many 
Americans?- How many Saudis? How many British? This is the 
real burden sharing. 
\I have implored the President, who also has been there in 
World War II, that what we are attempting to do in the Con-
gress of the United States is to strengthen his hand for peace, 
not to give him a license to see how fast we can become 
engaged in armed confiict. As far as this Senator knows, there 
is nothing in the U.N. resolution that says on January 15 you 
have to do something. But I think on January 15 Saddam 
Hussein will understand that if he wants peace, he can have 
it. 
Mr. President, I know that everyone in this Chamber wants 
Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait, and some have addi-
tional demands they would make on Saddam Hussein. 
I happen to believe that the resolution we are about to vote 
on docs exactly the wrong thing. As I have indicated, it actually 
gives Saddam Hussein a holiday from the threat that we might 
use force, if I tell you, well, on January 15 we are going to let 
sanctions work some interminable length of time - not 6 
months. 
230 
There is nothing about 6 months. The distinguished Pres-
ident pro tcmporc indicated 6 months which might be a rea-
sonable time. Maybe 1 month is a reasonable time. 
We have all had our experiences with sanctions in other 
parts of the world, generally without any military threat at all. 
It would seem to me that the pending resolution wipes out this 
credible threat unless we arc going to maintain 400,000 men 
there and all the military threat we have up unul some day in 
the future, maybe this year or next year or the next year. 
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 
votes cast by the Senator from West Virginia, this being the 
most difficult. 
I do not have quite that many, but this is a very difficult vote 
and when I vote no I want Saddam Hussein to understand tha; 
I want peace, and I want him to understand that we arc pre. 
paring our President, as we will on the next vote, to use force 
if necessary. I want our President to understand this is not 
some hunting license, that this is to strengthen his hand for 
peace, not war but for peace. That is the message I believe will 
result after all the voting is done this afternoon. 
Mr. President, I thank the Chair. 
I have always thought if you had sort of a holiday, as Saddam 
Hussein would have, he probably would not just take the hol-
iday; he would probably dig in_dceper and make preparations 
so he could Inflict even more casualties on the United States MR. President, .,;..c are not going to change any minds. 
and on our young men ·and other forces from other allied I think everybody's mind has been made up. But I. 
nations in this period. So it is a two-edged sword. think in addition to a lot of hopes, there is a real 
It seems to me we have to think about the ultimate result. world out there. I am not certain any of us can predict with 
Do we save lives by waiting 6 months, or waiting a year, or do certainty, if there should_~.!! cpnfiict, how many lives would 
we by our votes today jrtdicate to Saddam Hussein ~now_. it i~ be lost, how much of a cost, how long it would last.·· ·· 
up to you?" • . I do believe that our best c;.hance for peace and best hope for 
President Bush· did not start this war. I must say f h~ve bccrr. p.caac; is to str~ngthe.n !h_~_ Pre~ident's hand in every way that 
a little astonished to hear some on this floor criticize President · we i:an. · · - · -
Bush without ever mentioning Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hus- \-The Senator from Ill~oisjust indicated it is going to be closely 
scin can end this today. He can end it tomorrow. · divided. Thai: is unfortunate. I wish it were not, I wish we could 
So I want to vote for peace. I would like to have it both ways. get consent, after the vote, to do it on a voice vote that every· 
This Senator would like to figure out how I could. tell this body would support. I said I would not ask for that consent. 
group one thing and this group something else, but I have not I am not so concerned about the message we send to the 
been able to figure that out. Maybe some have. White House. I am more concerned about the message we 
But sooner or later there is going to be a moment of truth. send to Saddam Hussein. Somehow he has been forgotten in 
I do not think the time will ever come that I could look some this debate. He started it. He can end it right now. 
parent in the eye and say, "Well, I think it is fine; I can justify I agree with the majority leader that there is not one Sen· 
sending your son and risk his life anywhere in the world." ator in this body who wants war, not one on either side of the 
Maybe such an occasion might arise. aisle who wants war. I assume, by the same token, there is not 
So I hope, Mr. President, that we arc going to demonstrate one who does not want peace and a peaceful settlement. 
today that the President of the United States is the Com- Some have strong convictions following one path and some 
mander in Chief. have strong convictions on another path, but I think the bottom 
The Congress of the United States certainly has a role to play. line is that this is not a blank check, as far as this Senator is 
I said last November and December we ought to have been here concerned. I intend to use my influence, if any, in every way that 
debating then when the policy was being formulated instead of I can to find some peaceful way to resolve the current crisis. 
coming in at the 11th hour after having been AWOL for 3 or 4 It just seems to me that when we authorize, we do not man· 
months and try to change the direction of the policy President date. We do not say that it has to be today, tomorrow, or next 
Bush has so patiently and successfully put together. week. We authorize. I believe President Bush understands that 
This is not the United States versus Iraq. It is the entire it is an authorization. It is only an authorization. 
international community with just a few exceptions versus After we vote, there will be a vote in the House on this same 
Saddam Hussein and Iraq. resolution. It is going to be a massive vote of support for Pres· 
Let us not pull the rug out from under the President at this ident Bush, true bipartisanship in the House of Representa· 
last moment, at the 11th hour, when the pressure is building o'n tives, and I commend them for that. 
Saddam Hussein by the minute. Let us not give him any relief I commend my colleagues on the other side who will sup-
by our votes in the Congress. - port this resolution. I would encourage those who may have 
- I do not question anybody's motives, anybody's patriotism. voted for the. Nunn-Mitchell resolution to support this reso-
We all have the same objective. We all have the same goals. We lution. It is not contradictory. It demonstrates again that the 
all want to send a signal. But I think you should ask any neutral primary message coming from the Congress today is to .sa~· 
observer what would happen if somebody imposed a deadline, dam Hussein. The last time I checked, he was the real villain 
told me I had until a certain time to do something, and some- in this piece_ 
body else said, "Well, we arc going to give you another period Mr. President, for many reasons, this is a very important 
of time, nobody is going to say how long, but don't worry about vote. It is a very important time in history. The Senator fro!D 
the deadline because we are going to let sanctions work in the Connecticut pointed out that things in the Mideast arc always 
next month, or 2 months, or 6 months, or 12 months, or 2 years, difliculL 
or 3 years, or 10 years." _But if WC postpone it for 6 weeks or 6 months or 1 year. iS 
I think we know where the votes are. If we do not, we ought it going to be any less difficult? If we have a conflict at that 
to get some new counters. Nobody is going to be swayed by tilne; Will there be fewer casualties, or more? Will the st~CS 
what anyone says here. But I think it is important that we state be higher or lower? 
our views. The Senator from West Virginia talked of 20,000 It seems to me that if we could encourage more of our 
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colleagues - and I know that everyone has the same 
goal. and that is for Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait. 
· But if he draws the same conclusion as the Senator from 
Illinois has drawn.that America-is divided. that Corigres5 
is. divide~, he. ·may think he is going to get a free ride; he is 
goiitg to be rescued. maybe, by the Congress; we are going to 
wow him an anchor. But if we throw him one, I want it to go 
down. 
Mr. President, I would hope my colleagues would support 
this resolution, the resolution offered by the distinguished 
Senator from Virginia (Mr. Warner], the distinguished Sena· 
tor from Connecticut [Mr. Lieberman], and others of us on 
both sides of the aisle. This is the time. Oh, there will be other 
times, but this is the time to send the message. There is not 
much time left. 
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There is not much time left, and to President Bush I say, as 
I said earlier, this is to strengthen your hand; this is to give you 
every resource we can in the final 48 or 72 hours to send the 
message that we want a peaceful settlement. 
And to Saddam Hussein. again, to underscore that some 
message, plus to send him an additional message that Con-
gress has acted. We have had bipartisan debate, and we have 
had some partisan debate. But we are going to have a bipar-
tisan result in the House of Representatives and the U.S. 
Senate. 
So for all of us who want peace; for all of us who want to 
strengthen the President of the United States, along with 82 
percent of the American people, the vote on this resolution 
should be yes. 
Mr. President, I yield the floor. 
The Persian Gulf Crisis 
\ \ 
By GEORGE J. MITCHELL, U~'itid States Senator from Maine 
. Delivered to the United States Senate •. Washington, D.C, January JO, 1991 
FOR two centuries Americans have debated the relative He was not required to seek the approval of Congress to powers of the President and Congress. Often it has been order that deployment, and he did not do so. 
an abstract argument. But today that debate is real The · But if he now decides to use those forces in what would 
men who wrote the Constitution had as a central purpose the plainly be war he is legally obligated to seek the prior approval 
prevention of tyranny in America. They had lived under a of Congress. 
British king. They did not want there ever to be an American The President has the authority to act in an emergency, and 
king. They were brilliantly successful. In our history there have . to authorize our forces to defend themselves if attacked. But, 
been 41 presidents and no kings. that's not what's now at issue. 
The writers of our Constitution succeeded by creating a Two days ago, the President in writing requested that Con-
government with separate institutions and divided powers. · gress authorize him to implement the United Nations Reso-
They correctly reasoned that if power were sufficiently dis-' lution authorizing "all necessary means" to expel Iraq from 
persed, no institution or individual could gain total power. Kuwait. 
Nowhere has their concept been more severely tested than But yesterday the President said that, in his opinion, he 
in what they regarded as one of the greatest powers of gov- needs no such authorization from the Congress. I believe the 
ernment - the power to make war. correct approach was the one taken by the President two days 
The Constitution- designates the President as Commander ago when he requested authorization. His request clearly 
in Chief of the Armed Forces. With that designation comes acknowledged the need for Congressional approval. 
the authority to direct the deployment of those forces. The Constitution of the United States is not and cannot be 
. But the Constitution also grants to th~ Congress the author- subordinated to a United Nations resolution. 
1ty to raise and suppor~ ·amiies and· to ·declare war. So today the Senate undertakes a solemn Constitutional 
This division of authority '\Vas a decision consciously reached . responsibility: To decide whether to commit the nation to war. 
by the framers of the Constitution. The earliest draft of the 'in this debate, we should focus on the fundamental question 
Constitution would have empowered the Congress to "make before us: What is the wisest course of action for our nation 
war," a greater grant of power than to "declare war." Itreflected in the Persian Gulf crisis? 
the deep concern of the Founding Fathers about too great a In its simplest form, the question is whether Congress 'IVi_l! 
concentration of powers in a single pair of hands. give the President an unlimited blank check to initiate war 
When it was argued that this wording might prevent the agafnst Iraq, -at some unspecified time in the future, under 
President from responding to an attack on this country, the circumstances which are not now known and cannot be fore-
Constitutional Convention agreed to share the power. After -seen;-or whether, while not ruling out the use of force if all 
the Revolutionary War, the Founders knew that a legislative other means fail, we will no\V.iirge continuation of the policy 
body could not direct the day-to-day operations of a war. ofcoricened international economic and diplomatic pressure. 
But they also knew that the decision to commit the nation to ·This is not a debate abOiifwhether force should ever be 
war should not be left in the hands of one man. The clear intent used. No one proposes to rule out the use of force. We cannot 
was to limit the authority of the President to initiate war. and should not rule it out. The question is should war be truly 
Our subsequent history has borne out their wisdom. a last reson when all other means fail? Or should we start with 
Acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief, President war, before other means have been fully and fairly ahausted? ~ush has deployed a vast American military force to the Per- This is not a debate about American objectives in the cur-
sian Gulf. rent aisis. · 
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There is broad agreement in the Senate that Iraq must, fully burden and a greater responsibility than other nations '11.ith an 
and unconditionally, withdraw its forces from Kuwait. equal or even greater stake in the resolution of the crisis. 
The issue is how best to achieve that goal. That's what's happening. And it's wrong. 
Most Americans and most Members of Congress, myself It may become necessary to use force to expel Iraq from 
included, supported the President's initial decision to de- KuwaiL _ 
ploy American forces to Saudi Arabia to deter further Iraqi But because war is such a grave undertaking. with such 
aggression. serious-Consequences, we must make certain that w-ar ls 
We supported the President's effort in marshalling inter- employed only as a last resort. 
national diplomatic pressure and the most comprehensive War carries with it great costs and high risk. An unknown 
economic embargo in history against Iraq. number of casualties and deaths; billions of dollars spent; a 
I support that pol icy. I believe it remains the correct policy, greatly disrupted oil supply and oil price increases: a war pos-
even though the President abandoned his own policy before it sibly widened ~o i11dude lsra~!,J"urkey or other allies; the pos-
had time to work. _ slble lorigterm American occupation of Iraq; increased insta-
The change began on Noveinber 8, when President Bush bilityinthePersianGulfregion;longlastingArabenmityagainst 
announced that he was doubling the number of American the United States; a possible return to isolationism at home. 
troops in the Persian Gulf to 430,000 in order to attain a The grave decision for war is being made prematurely. This 
"credible offensive option." is hard to understand. 
The President did not consult with Congress about that The Administration has yet to explain wtiy war is necessary 
decision. He did not try to build 'support for it among the now, when just. a couple of months ago, the Administration itself 
American people." He jus_t did it. said that sanctions and diplomacy were the proper course. There 
In so doing, President Bush transformed the United States' · has been no clear rationale, no convincing explanation for shift. 
role and its risk in the Pe-rsian Gulf crisis. - · ,'ing American policy -from ·one of sanctions to one of wat 
In effect, the President - overnig!lt, with no consultation \ The policy of economic and diplomatic sanctions was the 
and no public debate - changed American policy from being President's policy. He and other Administration officials 
part of a collective effort to enforce economic and diplomatic repeatedly called it the best policy to pursue. They descnoed 
sanctions into a predominantly American effort relying upon pq_sitively the effect that the sanctions were having on Iraq. 
the use of American military force. By definition, sanctions President Bush told a joint session of Congress in Septem-
require many nations to participate and share the burden. ber that: 
War does not. " ... these sanctions are working. Iraq is feeling the 
Despite the fact that his own policy of international eco- heat ... Iraq's leaders ... are cut off from world trade, 
nomic sanctions was having a significant effect upon the Iraqi unable to sell their oil, and only a tiny fraction of goods 
economy, the President, without explanation. abandoned that get through." 
approach and instead adopted a policy based-first and fore- Those were the President's words. 
most upon the use of American military force. In October, Secretary of State Baker said sanctions must 
As a result, this country has been placed on a course toward remain the focus of American efforts. He said: 
war. 
This has upset the balance of the President's initial policy, 
the balance between resources and responsibilities, between _ 
interests and risks, and between patience and strength. 
Opposition to aggression is not solely an American value. It 
is universal. If there is to be war in the Persian Gulf, it should 
not be a war in which Americans do the fighting and dying 
while those who benefit from our effort provide token help and 
urge us on. Yet, as things now stand, that's what it would be. 
The armed forces in the region should reflect the worldwide, 
concern about the problem. But they do not. Americans now\ 
make up more than three-fourths of the fighting forces in the. 
region. That's "-Tong and unfair. If this is to be an international 
effort, it should be an international effort in more than name 
only. Yet, as things now stand, th~t's what it could be: An 
international effort in name only. 
Iraq must leave Kuwait. There's no disagreement about that. 
Iraq must leave KuwaiL If necessary, it must be expelled; if 
need be, by force of arms. There's no disagreement on that. 
But in the event of war, why should it be an American war, 
·made up largely of American troops, American casualties, 
and American deaths? We hope there is no war. But if there 
iS, we hope _and pray that it will not be prolonged with many 
casual tics. 
Certainly the United States has a high responsibility to lead 
the international community in opposing aggression. 
But this should not require the U.S. to assume a greater 
" ... we must exercise patience as the grip of sanctions 
tightens with increasing severity." 
Acc0rding to CIA Director William Webster, the policy of 
sanctions is dealing a serious blow to the Iraqi economy. In 
December, he testified that: 
"· , . all sectors of the Iraqi economy are feeling the 
pinch of sanctions, and many industries have largely shut 
down." 
The President's initial policy against Iraq, to impose inter· 
national sanctions and enforce them using all necessary means, 
is working - as CIA Director Webster detailed. He and others 
have noted that: 
More than 90 percent of Iraq's imports and 97 percent of its 
expons have been stopped. 
Industrial production in Iraq has declined by 40 percent 
since August. 
Many industries, including Iraq's only tire manufacturer, 
have either closed or sharply reduced production due to th~ 
shortage of industrial imports. 
The flow of spare parts and military supplies from the Soviet 
Union and France, Iraq's major suppliers, has stopped. 
Iraq's foreign exchange reserves have diminished drasticali}; 
hindering its ability to purchase foreign goods from smugglers. 
Food prices have skyrocketed. The Iraqi ·government has 
cut rations twice and has confiscated food on the open market. 
Agricultural production has been weakened by the depar· 
ture of foreign laborers. 
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Lines have appeared at.government distribution points for 
natural gas . 
. -··clearly this policy is not failing. It is having a significanL 
effect on Iraq. · 
Yet soon after the November 8 decision to deploy additional 
tr00PS to the Persian Gulf, Administration officials suddenly 
began expressing skepticism about whether the sanctions 
would have the desired effect. They argued that time was not 
on our side, that the Iraqi military would be able to strengthen 
its position in Kuwait. 
Not only are these arguments the opposite of what the same 
people were saying earlier, they are also not consistent with 
the assessment and projections of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. Director Webster told the Congress in December that 
continued sanctions will have an increasingly damaging effect 
not only on· the Iraqi economy, but also on the Iraqi military, 
weakening it over time. 
"The CIA estimated that continued sanctions will result in: 
The virtual depletion of Iraq's foreign exchange-reserves by 
spring. · . .. 
Multiplying. economic problems as Iraq transfer5 mere 
resources to the military. · · . 
The shutdown of nearly all but energy-related and military 
industries by the summer. 
Increasing inflation combined with reduced rations. 
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and mothers, husbands and wives, daughters and sons - the 
word "only" will have no meaning. 
And the truly haunting question, which no one will ever be 
able to answer, will be: Did they die unnecessarily? For if we 
go to war now, no one will ever know if sanctions would have 
worked if given a full and fair chance. 
The reality is that no course of action is free of risk. The 
prudent course now is to continue the President's initial policy 
of economic sanctions. 
Time io fortify Iraq's defenses will do little good if some of 
Iraq's planes can't fly for lack of spare parts, if some of its 
tanks can't move for lack of lubricants, if its infrastructure and 
ability to wage war has been weakened. 
If it eventually becomes necessary for the United States to 
wage war, our troops would have benefited from the additional 
time given for sanctions to degrade Iraq's military capabilities. 
The sanctions are being enforced. They are having an effect 
on Iraq. We should continue their enforcement and seek to 
enlarge their effect. 
I believe the best course now for the President and the 
nation is tn·"stay the course," to continue the policy the Pres-
ident so clearly establi~ed at the outset of this crisis. It offers 
the best hope now for the achievement of our objectives at the 
lowest Cost in lives and treasure. That is a goal we all share. 
A severe· re- lnction in basic commodities such as cooking TWO THEMES have recurred throughout this debate, 
oils and sugar. · from both sides. First, the Senate is unanimous in 
A reduction ·in the grain supply by half. insisting that Iraq leave Kuwait. Iraq's invasion of 
These effects will certainly weaken the Iraqi regime and Kuwait is brutal and illegal, should have been and was con-
degrade Iraq's military capabilities: demned, and must be reversed. It will be reversed. 
~decrease in the Iraqi Air Force's ability to fly regular This is not a debate about that objective. It is a debate about 
missions after three to six months, due to its dependence on how best to achieve that objective. 
foreign equipment and technicians. In its simplest form, the.question befqre us is whether Con-
A deterioration of the readiness of Iraq's ground and air gress will give to the President an unlimited blank check to 
forces after nine months. initiate war against Iraq, at some unspecified future time, 
A reduction in the Iraqi military's transport and mobility underrueumstances which are not now known and cannot be 
capabilities, due to shortages of critical supplies. foreseen, or whether, while not ruling out the use of force if all 
Given these effects of continued sanctions against Iraq, it is other means fail, we will now urge continuation of the policy 
clear that time is on the side of the international coalition. of concerted international economic and diplomatic pressure. 
But the anticipation of war has obscured a rational analysis The arguments for and against sanctions have been made in 
uf the initial policy set forth by the President. detail. 
It is significant that even the Administration cannot and I simply restate my firm conviction that _!!le best course now 
does not say that the policy of sanctions has failed. for the President and the nation is to "stay the course," to 
To this moment, neither the President nor any member of continue the policy the President himself so clearly established 
his Administration has said that sanctions have failed. In . at the outset of this crisis. 
response to my direct question just a few days ago, both the \ That policy is hurting Iraq's economy and reducing its mil-
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense acknowl- itary capability. It offers the best prospect for a peaceful solu-
edged that sanctions have not failed. But, they say, they can- tion, or, failing that, for weakening Iraq's military force. 
not guarantee that sanctions will get Iraq out of Kuwait by · In short, the policy of continuing international diplomatic 
January 15. Of course, no one has ever asked for such a and economic pressure against Iraq offers the best hope now 
guarantee. Those who advocate continuing the policy of for achieving our common objective at the lowest cost in lives 
sanctions recognize that it does not guarantee success by and treasure. 
January 15 or any other time certain. It involves a risk. The The second recurring theme in this debate is that no Sen-
rislC· is that the international coalition will fall apart before ator wants war. We all know that to be true. No Senator wants 
Iraq leaves Kuwait. 
. But prematurely abandoning the sanctions and immediately 
going to war also involves risk. The ri~k there is foremost.in 
human life. How many people will die? How many young 
Americans will die? That's a risk, a temble risk. 
Just this morning I heard it said that there may be "only" a 
few thousand American casualties. . 
But for the families of those few thousand - the fathers 
war. That is not the issue. 
The issue is whether by our votes we authorize war, imme-
diately, warwith its great cost; war with its high risk, war which 
could be aYOided, war which may be unnecessary. 
That's the issue. 
Let no one be under any illusions about the differences between 
these C'AO resolutions. They are fundamentally different. 
One authorizes immediate war. The other does not. 
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That is the difference. That is the central issue we are voting 
on today. . . 
Those Senators who vote forthe second resolution are voting 
to authorize war immediately. That is the very title of the res-
olution: .. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq." 
I understand the argument of those who support that res-
olution that they hope its passage prevents war. 
But the reality is that if that hope is not realized, if imme-
diate war docs occur, passage of that resolution will have been 
an essential prerequisite for that war under our Constitution 
and our democratic system. . 
The essence of democracy is accountability and if immedi-
ate war occurs, that resolution, and those who voted for it, 
must share that accountabilicy. 
The President has submitted to the Congress a written 
request for authorization to use military force. That is the title 
of the resolution. In the current circumstances clearly it would 
be of such a scope and intensity that can only be descn"bed as. 
war. So the second resolution is, plainly, by its Own words, and 
by the circumstances which exist in the Periian Gulf, ari autho-
rization for war. . 
Of that there can be no doubt or dispute. That is what wc 
will be voting for, or against, today. 
I urge my colleagues to vote against· authorizing an imme-
diate war. 
I have discussed two things we have heard a lot about. Let 
me close by discussing something wc have heard little about. 
It is this question: In the event of war, why should it be an 
American war, made up largely of American troops, American 
casualties, American deaths? 
The first resolution, the Nunn Resolution, directly addresses 
this concern by supporting "efforts to increase the military and 
financial contnbutions made by allied nations." 
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The second resolution does not mention the subject. 
Certainly the United States has a high responsibility to lead 
the international community in opposing aggression. ___ , 
But this should not require the United States to assume~a 
greater role and a greater responsibiJity than other nations 
with an equal or even greater stake in the resolution of this 
crisis. That's what's happening. And it is wrong. · - . 
It may become necessary to use force to expel Iraq from 
Kuwait. 
But because war is such a grave undertaking, with such 
serious Consequences, we should make certain that war is 
employed only as a last resort. · · ----. 
· War carries with it great costs and high risk. The possibil-
ities of spending billions of dollars; a greatly disrupted oil 
supply and oil price increases; a war widened to include Israel, 
Turke~ or other allies; the longterm American occupation of 
.!raq; increased instability in the Persian Gulf region; long-
standing Arab enmity against the United States; a return to 
isolationism at home. All of these risks are there. 
. - But .the largest risk, the greatest risk, the most profound risk 
is 'th!lt of the loss of human life. How many people will die? 
Haw many young Americans will die? 
"And for the families of those young Americans who die, for 
every one of us, the truly haunting question will be: Did they 
die unnecessarily? 
No one will ever be able to answer that question-. For if we 
go to war now, no one will ever know if sanctions would have 
worked if given a full and fair chance. 
I urge my colleagues to vote for the first resolution, the 
Nunn Resolution, to vote for continuing economic sanctions 
and diplomatic pressure. I urge my colleagues to vote against 
the second resolution, to vote against an authorization for 
immediate war. 
The Persian Gulf Crisis 
By JOHN C. DANFORTH, United States Senator from Missouri 
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MADAM PRESIDENT, like all Illy colleagues, I have been engaged in intensive soul-searching on how I 
will vote on the question now before the Senate, 
whether to support the President if he determines force is' 
necessary to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Throughout this soul-
searching, two convictions have been foremost in my mind. 
First, I am convinced beyond a doubt that the United States 
must not allow the status quo in Kuwait to stand. Some have 
argued that the President has not made a clear case for Amer-
ica's insistence that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait, but for 
me the President's case is both crystal clear and overwhelm-
ingly convincing. 
_Jhis is the first major test of the post-cold-war wodd or~r, 
Witn t_l'i_e re~ent collapse of the.SoViet Empire; the great threat 
wc have feared since 1945 is no longer real. The likelihood is . 
z~i~!lt .. tbe Soviet Union will precipitate war by invading 
Western Europe. But the events of August 2 have demon-
strated to all that to be rid of one threat does not make the 
woi:.ld safe. A growing list of countries now possess or soon will 
p0ssess the instruments of mass_ destruction. One of those 
countries is Iraq. It is simply not sufficient to check the pos-
sibility of terrifying aggression at one of its sources. We must 
be prepared to check terrifying aggression at all of its sources. 
In Kuwait, Iraq is the aggressor, and its actions cannot be 
tolerated. Nearly all of us agree on this point. Iraq attacked its 
neighboi; occupied its territory, and brutalized its people. It 
has fielded a massive army with chemical and biological war· 
· fare capability that it has no compunctions about using. I~!!~~ 
controls 20 percent of the world's prolo'.en oil reserves, and, if 
undeterred, it could control an additional 25 percent of world 
. reserve$ in Saudi Arabia by conquest or intimidati°-n. · 
. - s~.me people have asked whether this confiict is not "just 
about:()il •. Tome, that is like askingwhetherit is not just about 
oxygen. Like it °-!"not, our country, together with the _rest of the 
'"'5rld;-is utterly dependent on oil. Our ea>nomy, our jobs, our 
ability to defend ourselves are dependent on our access to oil. 
To control the world's supply of oil is in a real sense to control 
the world. So what is involved in the Persian Gulf today is not 
only the preservation of the world order and the prevention of 
brutal aggression; it is the vital economic and security inter-
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ests of the United States and the rest of the world as well. 
for many years. commentators of various philosophical 
stripes. especially liJteral commentators, have argued ~at the 
United States should not go it alone in the world. We sjl9ylr:t 
not take it '!pon ourselves to be the world's police.man. So the 
eommentators have argued, with respect to Central America 
and elsewhere, that our country should not act unilaterally; we 
should work with other countries; we should address crises on 
a multilateral basis. 
This is exactly what President Bush has done with respect to 
the present crisis. He has gone repeatedly to the United 
Nations Security Council for approval of concerted action. He 
and Secretary of State Baker have consulted incessantly with 
countries throughout the world. He has asked for and received 
the military and economic support of more than 20 nations. 
He has been widely acclaimed, especially by the liberals, for 
this multilateral approach. 
It is argued that while many nations have done something, 
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But, Madam President, after consulting with the best advice 
I can find, I have concluded that there is no comfort to be 
found in that proposition. It is clear to me that sanctions itlone 
cannot reverse the status quo. Sanctions alone will cause suf-
fering to the civilian population of Iraq but they will not force 
t~e_ Iraqi Anny from Kuwait. And causing suffering to a. civil-
ian population without military results should never be the 
objective of a civilized nation. 
I referthe Senate, as others have today, to the public testimony 
of Director of Central Intelligence Webster before the House 
Armed Services Committee on December 5, 1990. I ask unani-
mous consent, as others have, Madam President, that a transcript 
of that testimony be printed in the Record at this point. 
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows: 
Sanctions in the Per.rilln Gulf 
Iraq, 11re Domestic Impact of Sanctions, December 4, 1990 
few nations have done ·enough. I suppose this point yrould TE you, Mr:. Chairman. I appreciate the opportu· 
always.be made no matter what the degree of c:QII1fllitmen~ by· a~dress this committee on what the intelligence 
our partners. But what are we· to make of ~ch an argument?- . . comm nity believes the sanctions have already aC:com-
That multilateralism was a mistake after all? That no matter pliShed a.nd wl,lat we belji:ve the sanctions are likely to accom-
bow assiduously pursued, it never really works? plish over· time. Of c:Ourse, sanctions are only one type of 
The advocates of multilateralism cannot have it both ways. · pressure being applied on Iraq, and their impact cannot be 
They cannot applaud it one day, and jeer at it the nexL Would completely distinguished from the combined impact of mili· 
that there were more leaders from the free world, but the fact tary. diplomatic, and economic initiatives on Iraq. 
is that the United States is the leader. We are the one remain- At the technical level, economic sanctions and the embargo 
ing world power. And if the United States now retreats from against Iraq have put Saddam Hussein on notice that he is 
its commitment for a joint effort on the ground that others are isolated from the world community and have dealt a serious 
not as strong or as firm as we are, all the efforts to seek Secu- blow to the Iraqi economy. More than lCJO countries are sup-
rity Council resolutions and to consult with other governments porting the U.N. resolutions that impose economic sanctions 
will ·have been an exercise of futility, recognized as such on Iraq. Coupled with the U.S. Government's increased ability 
throughout the world. to detect and follow up on attempts to circumvent the blockade, 
The captain cannot abandon the ship. Having gained the the sanctions have all but shut off Iraq's exports and reduced 
approval of so many other governments, some of which are on imports to less than 10 percent of their preinvasion level. All 
the very border of Iraq and in great peril for their survival, .it sectors of the Iraqi economy are feeling the pinch of sanctions 
is unthinkable .1h.a.t. our Government would.now .lose its will. and many industries have largely shut down. Most importantly, 
H;ving urged the world to approve combined action, it is not the blockade has eliminated any hope Baghdad had of cashing 
an option for the Congress of the United States to disapprove in on higher oil prices or its seizure of Kuwait oilfields. 
what we for months have asked others to support. Despite mounting disruptions and hardships resulting from 
This then is my first conviction: We cannot accept Iraq's sanctions, Saddam apparently believes that he can outlast 
occupation of Kuwait. international resolve to maintain sanctions. We see no indi-
My second conviction is that - war with Iraq would be a . cation that Saddam is concerned, at this point, that domestic 
disaster we should do everything to avoid. I have belic:Ved and .. discontent is growing to levels that may threaten his regime or 
I do believe that the negative consequences of·war far out- '·.that problems resulting from the sanctions are causing him to 
weigh the positive. These negatives· have totally consumed my rethink his policy on KuwaiL The Iraqi people have experi-
thinking and I have expressed them to the President and to key enced considerable deprivation in the past. Given the brutal 
members of his administration. nature of the Iraqi security services, the population is not 
I foresee many casualties, the use of chemical weapons by likely to oppose Saddam openly. Our judgment has been, and 
Iraq, terrorist strikes, Israel's involvement, and long-lasting continues to be, that there is no asssurance or guarantee that 
turmoil· in· the Middle East. Repeatedly. I asked myself the economic hardships will compel Saddam to change his policies 
same question: When we win the war,. then what happens? or lead to internal unrest that would threaten his regime. 
What happens to the balance of power in the Middle East? To Let me take a few minutes to review briefly with you some 
_the-governance of Iraq? To the stability of friendly govern- of the information that led us to these conclusions, as well as 
ments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia? Repeatedly I have come to to present our assessment of the likely impact of sanctions 
the-Saiiieanswers. While the statuS quo is unacceptable, the over the coming months. 
alternative of war is even worse. ·· · · · The blockade and embargo have worked more etfectively 
'Bci:ause of this conclusion I have for some time believed than Saddam probably expected. More than 90 percent of 
that if I had to vote on the matter, I would vote against autho- importsand97perccntofexportshave beenshutotf.Although 
~ng the President to use military force. I have taken comfort there is smuggling across Iraq's borders, it is extremely small 
Ill the proposition that we will so<>n be voting on it here in the relative to Iraq's pre-crisis trade. Iraqi efforts to break sanc-
Senate. Let us give sanctions a_ chance to work. tions have thus far been largely unsuccessful. What little leak-
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age that has occurred is due largely to a relatively small num-
ber of private firms acting independently. We believe most 
countries arc actively enforcing the sanctions and plan to con-
tinue doing so. 
Industry appears to be the hardest hit sector so far. Many 
firms are finding it difficult to cope, with the departure of 
foreign workers and with the cutoff of imported industrial 
inputs - which comprised nearly 60 percent of Iraq's total 
imports prior to the invasion. These shortages have either shut 
down or severely curtailed production by a variety of indus-
tries, including many light industrial and assembly plants as 
well as the country's only tire-manufacturing plant. Despite 
these shutdowns, the most vital intjustries - including electric 
power generation and refining - do not yet appear threat-
ened. We believe they will be able to function for some time 
because domestic consumption has been reduced, because 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti facilities have been cannibalized and 
be.cause some stockpiles and surpluses already existed. 
The cutoff of Iraq's oil exports and the success of sanctions 
also have choked off Baghdad's financial resources. This too 
has been more effective and inore complete than Saddam 
probably expected. Iii fact. we believe that a lack of foreign 
exchange will, in time, be Iraq's greatest economic difficulty. · 
The embargo has deprived Baghdad of roughly Sl.5 billion of 
foreign exchange earnings monthly. We have no evidence that 
Iraq has significantly augmented the limited foreign exchange 
reserves to which it still has access. As a result, Baghdad is 
working to conserve foreign exchange and to devise alternative 
methods to finance imports. 
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We expect Baghdad's foreign exchange reserves to become 
extremely tight, leaving it little cash left with which to entice 
potential sanctions busters. At current rates of depiction, we 
estimate Iraq will have nearly depicted its available foreign 
exchange reserves by next spring. Able to obtain even fewer 
key imports, Iraq's economic problems will begin to multiply 
as Baghdad is forced to gradually shut down growing numbers 
of facilities in order to keep critical activities functioning as 
long as possible. Economic conditions will be noticeably worse, 
and Baghdad will find allocating scarce resources a signifi-
cantly more difficult task. 
Probably only energy-related and some military industries 
will still be fully functioning by next spring. This will almost 
certainly be the case by next summer. Baghdad will try to keep 
basic services such as electric power from deteriorating. The 
regime also will try to insulate critical military industries to 
prevent an erosion of military preparedness. Nonetheless, 
reduced rations, coupled with rapid infiation and little addi-
tional support from the Government will compound the eco-
-nomic .pressures facing most Iraqis. 
·.BY. next spring, Iraqis will have made major changes in their 
diets: Poultry, a staple of the Iraqi diet, will not be available; 
Unless Iraq receives humanitarian food aid or unless smug-
gling increases, some critical commodities, such as sugar and 
edible oils will be in short supply. Distribution problems are 
likely to create localized shortages. But we expect that Bagh-
dad will be able to maintain grain consumption - mainly 
wheat, barley, and rice - at about two-thirds of last year's level 
until the next harvest in May. 
The spring grain and vegetable harvest will again augment 
food stocks, although only temporarily. To boost next year's 
food production, Baghdad has raised prices paid to farmers 
for their produce and decreed that farmers must cultivate all 
available land. Nonetheless, Iraq does not have the capability 
to become self-sufficient in food production by next yeai: 
Weather is the critical variable in grain production and even if 
it is good, Iraqis will be able to produce less than half the grain 
they need. In addition, Iraq's vegetable production next year 
may be less than normal because of its inability to obtain seed 
stock from al:!road. Iraq had obtained seed from the United 
States, The Netherlands, and France. 
Although sanctions are hurting Iraq's civilian economy, they 
are affecting the Iraqi millitary only at the margins. Iraq's 
fairly static, defensive posture will reduce wear and tear on 
We believe Baghdad's actions to forestall shortages offood 
stocks - including rationing, encouraging smuggling, and 
promoting agricultural production - are adequate for the 
next several months. The fall harvest of fruits and vegetables 
is injecting new supplies into the market and will provide a 
psychological as well as tangible respite from mounting pres-· 
surcs. The Iraqi population, in general, has access to sufficient 
staple foods. Other foodstuffs - still not rationed - also 
remain available. However, the variety is diminishing and prices 
are sharply inflated. For example, sugar purchased on the open 
market at the official exchange rate went from S32 per 50 kilo-
gram bag in August to $580 per bag last month. Baghdad 
remains concerned about its food stocks and, increasingly, to 
divert supplies to the military. Iii late November, Baghdad cut 
civilian rations for the second time since the rationing pro-
gram began, while announcing increases in rations for.military 
personnel and their families. 
On balance, the embargo has increased the economic hard-
ships facing the average Iraqi. In order to supplement their 
rations, liaqis must turn to the black market, where most goods 
can be purchased but at highly inflated prices. They are forced 
to spend considerable amounts of time searching for reason-
ably priced food or waiting in lines for bread and otherrationed 
items. In addition, services ranging from medical care to san-
itation have been curtailed. But these hardships are easier for 
Iraqis to endure than the combination of economic distress, 
high casualty rates, and repeated missile and air attacks that 
Iraqis lived with during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. During 
this war. incidentally, there was not a single significant public 
disturbance even though casualties hit 2.3 percent of the total 
Iraqi population - about the same as the percentage of U.S. 
\military equipment and, as a result, extend the life of its inven-
'tory of spare parts and maintenance items. Under now-combat 
conditions, Iraqi ground and air forces can probably maintain 
near-current levels of readiness for as long as nine months. 
casualties during the Civil War. · 
Looking ahead, the economic picture changes somewhat. 
We expect the Iraqi Air Force to feel the effects of the 
sanctions more quickly and to a greater degree than the Iraqi 
ground forces because of its greater reliance on high technol-
ogy and foreign equipment and technicians. Major repairs to 
sophisticated aircraft like the F-1 will be achieved with sig-
nificant difficulty, if at all, because of the exodus of foreign 
technicians. Iraqi technicians, however, should be able to main-
tain current levels of aircraft sorties for three to six months. 
The Iraqi ground forces arc more immune to sanctions. 
Before the invasion, Baghdad maintained large inventories of 
basic military supplies, such as ammunition, and supplies prob-; 
ably remain adequate. The embargo will eventually hurt Iraqi 
armor by preventing the replacement of old fire-control syste11'.5 
and creating shortages of additives for various critical lubn-
JOHN C. DANFORTH 
c;ants. Shortages will also affect Iraqi cargo trucks over time. 
Mi: Chairman, while we can look ahead several months and 
predict the gradual deterioration of the Iraqi economy, it is 
1110re difficult to assess how or when these conditions will 
cause Saddam to modify his behavior: At present, Saddam 
aJinost certainly assumes that he is coping effectively with the 
sanctions. He appears confident in the ability of his security 
services to contain potential discontent, and we do not believe 
be is troubled by the hardships Iraqis will be forced to endure. 
Saddam's willingness to sit tight and try to outlast the sanc-
tions or, in the alternative, to avoid war by withdrawing from 
Kuwait will be determined by his total assessment of the polit· 
ical, economic, and military pressures arrayed against him. 
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can be maintained. This is especially true if Iraq does not 
believe a coalition attack is likely during this period. Iraq's 
infantry and artillery forces - the key elements of Iraq's 
initial defense - probably would not suffer significantly 
as a result of sanctions. Iraq could easily maintain the 
relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and 
artillery units and can produce virtually all of the ammu-
nition for these forces domestically. Moreover, these 
forces will have additional opportunity to extend and 
reinforce their fortifications along the Saudi border,_ 
thereby increasing their defensive strength." 
The Director then says: 
"On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in 
Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the THE conclusion of Director Webster is that sanctions in simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications. themselves will not lead to the overthrow of Saddam Iraq's Air Force and air defenses arc more likely to be 
Hussein, and that they will not lead him to change his hit far more severely than its army, if effective sanctions 
palicy toward Kuwait. The Director states that if Saddam Hus- arc maintained for another 6 to 12 months. This degra-
sein decides to withdraw from Kuwait, that decision, and I quote, dation will diminish Iraq's ability to defend its strategic 
"will be determined by his total assessment of political, assets from air attack and reduce its ability to conduct 
economic, and military pressures arrayed against him." similar attacks. on its neighbors. It would have only a 
It is my privilege to serve on the Select Committee on Intel- marginal impact on Saddam's ability to hold Kuwait and 
ligencc. I am precluded, of course, from divulging classified southern Iraq. The Iraqi Air Force is not likely to play 
information I have received in briefings in that committee. a major role in any battle for Kuwait. 
However, I am free to state my own conclusions on the basis Our judgment remains that even if sanctions continue 
of my total understanding. My conclusion is this. Standing by to be enforced for an additional 6 to 12 months, eco-
themselves and without the credible threat of military force, nomic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to 
sanctions have no chance of expelling Iraq from Kuwait. retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popu-
Somc have argued that sanctions would over time weaken Jar discontent in Iraq." 
Iraq's military position and make an eventual confiict less costly So is time on our side, Madam President, as I have long 
to American forces. But this assumption is not borne out by . wanted to believe? I cannot persuade myself that this was any 
the best available advice, including Director Webster's public more than wishful thinking on my part. 
testimony. The Director states that "Under known combat What happens for the next 9 months or a year, or more than 
conditions, Iraqi ground and air forces can probably maintain a year; as we vainly wait for the Iraqis to leave their fortifica-
near current levels of readiness for as long as 9 months." He tions? Do we keep more than 400,000 troops in place through 
- further states that the Iraqi Air Force would feel the effects of Ramadan, through the Hadj, through the summer? And if so, 
sanctions to a greater degree than ground forces, which arc what happens to their readiness, their support by the Amer-
morc immune to sanctions, but it is ground forces that dug into ican people, their acceptance by the Muslim masses? To ask 
Kuwait in massive numbers and it has been said that ground these questions is to answer them. 
forces have never been defeated by air superiority alone. To wait for sanctions to work is to wait while we get weaker 
Madam President, I know that there have been various a!ld Iraq bides its time. The one and only chance to accomplish 
interpretations offered in the Senate about exactlywhat Direc- .. our objectives without war is to maintain sanctions accompa-
tor Webster said in his testimony on December 5. It could be nied by a credible military threat. Without a credible military 
said that he testified that sanctions work, Madam President, if threat, our alternative is sanctions followed by nothing at all. 
the meaning of "wcirk~ is to infiict pain oil civilians, that con- \The key to peace is maintaining a credible military threat, and 
clusion is absolutely corrcet. But there is no way to read the this is precisely the point our pending votes will address. Those 
testimony of Director Webster-oilDecember 5 and come out who would give sanctions a chance before military action is even 
with a conclusion that the sanctions offer any possibility of possible v.uuld decouple the two components which must be kept 
removing Iraq from Kuwait in the foreseeable future. linked, if wc have any chance of getting Iraq out of Kuwait with· 
I would like to quote just a few excerpts from the letter that out a fight. They v.uuld foreclose any possioility of a just peace. 
Director Webster has written today to Chairman Aspin, of the This is why I cannot vote for sanctions alone. This is why I 
House Armed Services Committee. These arc the words of cannot ..ute to deprive the President of the credible threat of 
William Wcbster.First,characterizinghistestimonyofDccem- force. It is indeed a supreme irony that it is only through the 
her 5, he said: · threat of force that a stable world can be maintained. But that 
"I also testified that there was no evidence that sane- is an irony wc have recognized ever since World War II. 
tions would mandate a change in Saddam Hussein's Madam President, I do believe that Saddam Hussein pays 
·behavior and that there was no evidence when or even if attention to what we do and say in the Senate. I do believe that 
they would force him out of Kuwait." the President's credibility is our best hope, if we arc to prc-
And then the Director goes on and says this: serve a stable world without war: We will soon vote to enhance 
"The ability of the Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait that credibility or to undercut it. 
and Southern Iraq is unlikely to be substantially eroded I will support the President with my ..utes and with my 
over the next 6 to 12 months even if effective sanctions prayers. 
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The Persian Gulf Crisis 
By SAM NUNN, U.S. Senator from Georgia . 
Delivered to the Senate, Washington, D.C., January 10, 1991 
I T is regrettable that because of Iraqi intransigence, the meeting in Geneva this week with Secretary Baker pro-
duced no diplomatic breakthrough and very little that was 
encouraging. I noted with interest - and I must say with almost 
complc:te_ amazement·_: that the Iraqi Foreign_Ministei_ 
refused to accept President Bush's letter to Saddam Hussein 
because the letter, according to the Foreign Minister, w'as SUJl-:. 
posedly not polite. I have not.seen President Bush's lettei: But 
I find that Iraqi protest both ironic and, indeed, repulsive. 
Was it polite when Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons 
againSthis own people2 . .Ancl.then~again, against Iran? Was fr 
Polite'°whe? I~aqi forces laun~hed a brutal, unprovoked in~­
sion of Kuwait? Was it polite when Iraqi forces used savage 
0Qlence against innocent Kuwaiti Civilians and took hostage 
innocent foreigriefs residing in that country? 
-Saddam Hussein and his top spokesmen do not have the 
standing .in the court of world opinion to raise the issue of 
politeness. · 
Mr. President, I still believe there is room for some hope 
that diplomacy can succeed in avoiding war. But as January 
15th approaches, as so many of my colleagues have already 
observed, the Congress must act. Article 1, section 8 of the 
Constitution provides that the Congress clearly has the author-
ity and the duty to decide whether the Nation should go towai: 
In many past instances it is true that military actions have 
occurred without congressional authorization. Pursuant to the 
authority assumed by the President in his constitutional capac-
ity as Commander-in-Chief in today's fast-moving, intercon-
nected world with instant communications, a world plagued 
with nuclear weapons and international terrorism, there are 
certainly instances when United States military force must be 
used without congressional authorization. 
There are many gray areas where the Congress, by necessity, 
has permitted and even encouraged and supported military 
action by the Commander-in-Chief without specific authori-
zation and without a declaration of war. I do not deem every 
military action taken as war. I think there is always room for 
debate on definitions. But a war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait 
initiated by the United States and involving over 400,000 
American forces is not a gray area. ' 
In this case, I believe the Constitution of the United States 
is absolutely cleai: It is essential, to comply with the Consti-
tution and to commit the Nation, that Congress give its con-
sent before the President initiates a large-scale military offen-
sive against Iraq. I think the founding Fathers had a great deal 
of wisdom when they put this provision in the Constitution. 
One of the main reasons, of course, was to prevent one person 
from being King. They did not want that. But I also believe 
that there was another purpose, and that is to make sure that 
when this Nation goes to war and asks its young men and, 
increasingly, young women also to put their lives on the line, 
the Nation must commit itself before we ask them to lay down 
their lives. 
term but also long term. Many of us strongly believe a war to 
liberate Kuwait should be the last resort and that sanctions 
and diplomacy combined with a threat - a continuing threat 
of force - should be given more time. Should we give the 
President - after all of these debates when the die is cast _ 
should we give him blanket authority to go to war against Iraq 
to liberate Kuwait? This is the question we face. There are 
numerous questions that will have to be answered in the minds 
of each of us before casting our vote. 
The first question I try to ask when it comes to matters of 
war and peace is the question of whether a particular situation 
is vital to our Nation's security. In this case, is the liberation of 
Kuwait vital to our Nation '.s security? We all agree with the goal 
of restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty; no doubt about that. But 
have we concludecl--here that the liberation of Kuwait in the 
., next few weeks is so vital to our Nation's security that we must 
take military action now instead of waiting a few months -; 
waiting a period pf time to allow the economic embargo and 
blockage to take its toll? 
Back in August and September when the embargo was sue: 
cessfully - and I'd say very skillfully brought about by Pres-
ident Bush, through what I think was his superb leadership -: 
no one thought or predicted the embargo was going to be over 
by January. No one predicted we were going to be able to bring 
about the termination of Iraqi presence in Kuwait by January. 
None of the intelligence experts or other experts who testified 
felt the embargo was really going to have much effect before 
April or May of 1991 and almost all of them said it would take 
at least a year. There was no surprise about that. I'm absolutely 
amazed when people say well, we've waited four months and 
five months and the embargo is not working. They must not 
have been there at the beginning or they must not have talked 
to anybody at the beginning about how long it was going to 
take. It's very puzzling to me bow someone could give up on 
the embargo after five months when nobody that I know of 
predicted that it was going to last less than nine months to a 
year, and most people said a year to eighteen months from the 
time of inception, which was August of last year. 
The President's January 8th request that Congress approve 
the use of military force presents Congress with an issue, sim-
ply stated, but profound in is consequences; not simply short 
When we talk about the question of vital - a lot of times 
we in Washington throw that word around as if it's just another 
word. Sometimes we use so many words in the course of debate 
that we don't think carefully about what we mean. I recall very 
clearly.President Reagan's 1982 declaration that Leba_no~ w_~ 
vital.J_o_ the security of the United States. Shortly ther~er, 
following the tragic death of more than 200 Marines, we pulle~ 
ou( of Lebanon, we pulled out of a country that only a few 
weeks before had been declared vital. Today, as we debate this. 
eight years later, while pursuing our newly proclaimed vital 
interest in KuwaiL It was not vital before August 2nd. Nobody 
had said it was vital then. There was no treaty. In fact, when 
we were protecting Kuwaiti vessels coming out of the Gulf for 
several years during the Iran/Iraq war, the Kuwaitis didn't even 
let us refuel, as I recall I'd have to be checked on that one but 
that's my recollection. · - : 
All of a sudden it's vital - vital. And while this embargo bas 
been undertaken since August 2nd, and while we all seem to 
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take for granted that the liberation of Kuwait is vital, not just Last August, President Bush asserted himself, saying, quoting 
in general but in the next 2 or 3 or 4 weeks - while that's been him "Eamomic sanctions, in this instance, if fully enforced, can 
going on, our Government· has watched passively, said very be very, very efi"ective .•• and nobody can stand up forc:o.·er to 
little if anything, while our former enemy, a nation on the total economic deprivation." That is from President Bush. 
terrorist list for years and years and I believe it still is - Syria The international sanctions are, indeed, having a devastating _ 
- used its'military power to consolidate its control over Lcb- _efi"ect on !i:_aq's econom~ for_!WO basic reasons. The ir.iqi ccon-
anon. the same country that was our vital interest in 1982. So omy is based on oil, which accounts for about SO pe!Unt <?f_~he 
one of our so-called vital interests, Lebanon, eight years ago, country's GNP and almost 100 percent of the country's hard 
is now under the control of Syria, while we have pursued currency earnings. Iraq is essentially landlocked, dependent 
another vital interest. upon oil pipelines, foreign ports, and international highways for 
The point is, not all these things are simple. The point is we its imports and exports. As Georgetown University specialist on 
ought to be careful about defining vital. A lot of things are economic sanctions Dr: Gary Hufbaucr testifies before Senate:-
important, very important, that arc;n't vital. Vital in the sense "On no previous occasion have sanctions attracted 
of young men and young women being called to put their lives the degree of support thay have in the Iraqi case. Never 
on the line. have they been so comprehensive in· their coverage._ 
In more recent history, we defined Panama and Nicaragua Never have they imposed such enormous costs on the 
as vital, and we used force in the case of P.!1na111a directly. In target country. Moreover, Iraq's economy, geographically 
the case or-Nicarag~a, we supported force. I supporteq both _isolated and skewed as it is toward oil, is far more vul-
of those decisions. But after achieving our short-teim goals in . nera!:>Je to. economic coercion than other economies have 
both .these countries - we arrested Noriega and we cheeresf , ·.been the' target ·of SJ?ctions." . 
the election of President Chamorro ...,. we seem to have for- ·- The net result" to date is that the international sanctions 
gotten their on-going economic and political agony. Th~ Were have cu,t off more than 90 percent of Iraq's imports, almost 100 
countries in which we used or supported force for one reason percent of Iraq's exports, including virtually all of Iraqi oil 
or the other: Again I supported it in both cases. And now, exports. Iraqi industrial and military plants are receiving from 
while we're pursuing another vital interest, they are going abroad virtually no raw materials, no spare parts, no new 
through economic and political wrenching experiences with ·. equipment, no munitions, no lubricants. Moreover, Iraq now 
the outcome being very uncertain. Both the Bush Adminis- has no way to earn hard currency to purchase desperately 
tration and the Congress have unfulfilled responsibilities needed imports, even if they can be smuggled in spite of the 
regarding those two countries. embargo. "Amstel Light" beer may be available in Baghdad, 
My point is, Mr. President, we throw around the world "vital" but it is a very poor substitute for such essentials as motor oil 
very carelessly. When politicians declare an interest to be vital, and transmission fluid. 
our men and women in uniform arc expected to put their lives The key to a meaningful embargo is oil: so long as Iraq·s oil 
at risk to defend that interest. They train for years to be able to · expons arc shut down - and no one disputes that they are 
go out and, if necessary, give their Jives to protect what we shut do""11, no one; that is not in dispute - Saddam Hussein 
decalre to be vital. Sometimes when you sec how quickly we will be deprived of at least half of his country's GNP and 
come to use that term, it makes you wonder whether we are essentiallyallofhishardcurrcncyincome.Solongasoilexports 
fulfilling our responsibility to those men and women in uniform. are shut down, he will become progressively weaker - there 
We have an obligation as leaders to distinguish between impor- is.no doubt about that. We worry about recession in the United 
tant interests which are worthy of economic, political, and dip- States - we worry right now about a recession - we're talking 
lomatic clforts and interests that arc vital, that are worth the about whether the economy of the United States is going down 
calling by the leaders of this Nation on our young men and 3-5 percent of our G~P. and it's of great and legitimate con-
women in uniform to sacrifice, if necessary, their lives. cern. Saddain Hussein has to worry about a devastating reduc-
Former Secretary of Defense and former CIA Director James tion of approximately 70 percent of his GNP by the summer of 
Schlesinger spoke to this very point when he testified before our this year. By the end of this summer, the country will be an 
Committee. He testified that he did.not think liberation of economic b.asket case, and I mean Iraq and Saddam Hussein 
Kuwait "was a vital interest on the 2nd day of August, 1990." Dr. may be in jeopardy with his own people. 
Schlcsingci; howevei; went on to say, quoting him again: The question is: can anyone guarantee that Iraq will aban-
. " ••• the investment of the prestige of the President of don Kuwait when their GNP goes down 70 percent? Can any-
the United States now makes it vital (he does not use the body guarantee that? The answer is no. We can't guarantee 
word "vital" lightly) for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. I that. But the other options we have also must be held to the 
do not think that it is necessary, to achieve that objective, same standard. A sanctions policy is not perfect. There arc no 
forustoturntowa&lthinkthatwccanavoidwarandstill guarantees here. But it has to be weighed against the alter-
achieve the objective of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait." natives. The Bush Administration is correct when they point 
This brings up the next question. out that sanctions do not guarantee that Iraq will leave Kuwait. 
Are there reasonable alternatives to war? What is the like- But the story docs not end there. What guarantees do we have 
lihood that sanctions will work? In testimony before the Con- that the war will be brief and that American casualties will be 
Kress, and in public and private statements as recently as Jan- light? No one can say whether a war will last five days, five 
uary 3, the Bush Administration stopped short of saying that weeks, or five months. We know we can win, and we will win. 
sanctions cannot get Iraq out of Kuwait. The Administration There is no doubt about that. There is no doubt about who 
acknowledges the significant economic impact sanctions have ·wins this wu Our policy and our military planning, howcvci; 
hadonlraqbutnowsaysthcn:is"noguarantce"whcthcrornot cannot be based on an expectation that the war will be con-
theywillbringaboutanlraqidecisiontowithdrawfromKuwait. eluded quickly and easily. In large measure, the scope and 
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scale of the hostilities, once begun, will be determined by where in the world. We should take full advantage of the coa-
Iraq's willingness to absorb massive punishment and to fight lilion's superiority in air and sea powei; while establishing the 
on. A quick Iraqi 1n1litary collapse is possible in days. We hope capability of deploying additional ground forces to the region 
it will happen if war comes. But it cannot be assured. quickly if needed. 
The Administration argues that the coalition may crumble I find it puzzling, howevei; Mr. President, that proponents of 
before Iraq withdraws from Kuwait. The Senator from Loui- our early military option voice concern about the degradation 
siana, my good friend, referred to that. Admiral William of our 400,000-strong force, fully backed by the United States 
Crowe, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff', took and supported by numerous allies, yet at the same time, those 
this issue head-on during his testimony before the Armed Ser· favoring authorization of an early military offensive minim~ 
vices Committee last November. Quoting Admiral Crowe, the the degradation of Iraq's 500,000-man force in the Kuwaiti 
immediate past Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, "It is hard to theatei; a force essentially supported only by Iraq, totally lack-
understand," he said, "why some consider our international ing significant allies and subjected to a remarkably elfective 
alliance strong enough to conduct intense hostilities, but too international embargo. · · 
fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution." Mr. President, in weighing the costs of the military option, 
Mr. President, the Administration's position is that if we wait one must also consider our long-term interests in the region. 
for sanctions to work, Kuwait and its citizens will be funher Has there been any in-depth analysis in the Administration 
victimized. Tragi~ this is no doubt true. But to quote Admiral about what happens in the Middle East after we win? And we .· 
Crowe again: "War is not neat, not tidy; once you resort to it. war will win. The President's declared goals include establishing : 
isu.ncertainandamess."Theadditional.costtoKuwaitofletting stability in the Persian Gulf and protecting U.S. citizens 
sanctions work must be-:weighed again$t the cost to ~uY'illt in .• abrpad. G9nsjg~_ring the wave of Islamic reaction, anli-Amer-
terms of hum~n Jives, human sulferlng'. !!-~ weH- as national· 1.icanisfri an9. tcrrorisnHhal_ is likely lo be unleashed by a high I}! 
· resources, if the United States-leq coalition launches a "military Cleittilctive war. With many Arab ·casualties, it is difficult to 
olfensive to liberate a countty, which is heavily fortified: . ":ionceive of tJ:ie Middle East as a more stable region where 
Mr. President, those who support prompt militarfliction Americans will be safe. 
argue that delay will allow Iraq to strengthen its defensive Finally, the Administration has argued there is no guaran· 
positions in Kuwait, thereby adding to the eventual cost of tee economic hardships will in the end compel Saddam Hus-
forcing Iraq out of Kuwait. A couple of observations on this sein to withdraw from Kuwait. Mr. President, I have attended 
point. This would have been a better argument in September Intelligence Community as well as Defense and State Depart· 
and October of last year than it is today. Iraq already has had ment briefings for 18 years. I have been thinking back. I cannot 
five months to dig in and to fortify and they have done so in recall one instance where I ever came out of those briefings 
a major way. Kuwait has fortifications reminiscent of World with any guarantee of anything. For the Intelligence Commu· 
War I. This argument also overlooks the costs to the Iraqi nity to say they can't guarantee that Iraq is going to get out of 
military of sitting in Kuwait with a 500,000-man force while Kuwait because of the sanctions which is going to reduce his 
logistical support degrades because of the sanctions. GNP by 70 percent and cut olf all the hard currency, for them 
Mr. President, I am aware Director Webster sent Congress- to say that is true. Nobody can guarantee it. But what else have 
man Les Aspin a letter on January 10 that addressed this issue. they guaranteed? I haven't seen any guarantees on any subject 
I read the Webster letter as confirming that the sanctions, if from the Intelligence Community. It's not their fault. They're 
kept in place for six to twelve months, will severely degrade not in the business of guaranteeing. The CIA is not the FDIC. 
Iraq's armored forces, air force and air defenses. I consider They give you the factS, then you use common sense to come 
that good news. For some unexplained reason, and I'm sure to conclusions. 
people will have a reason, but I find it puzzling now because In summary, Mr. President, I believe that on balance there 
I don't understand what it is, Judge Webster implies that Iraq's is a reasonable expectation that continued economic sanctions, 
tanks, its air defenses, and its over 700 combat aircraft will not backed up by the threat of military force and international 
play an important role in Iraq's defense of Kuwait: i would isolation, can bring about Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. 1 
certainly ~ate to iry·to explain this"to several hundred Amer.~ believe that the risks associated with continued emphasis on 
ican pilots that are out there, the Air Force and Navy pilots, sanctions are considerably less than the very real risks associ· 
who have the job of putting their lives in their aircraft at risk ated with war and, most importantly, the aftermath of war in 
to knock out these very targets at the beginning stage of any a very volatile region of the world. 
conflict. I don't understand the Webster letter, frankly. Per- Many of my constituents in Georgia have written and called 
haps we will get more from that later. But it's incredible to me and asked me whether this is another Vietnam. Arc we about 
that he seems to write otI the importance of the tanks, the to get into another Vietnam? No. I do not believe so. I agree 
aircraft, and the air defenses. Everything I've heard is that we with President Bush and other Administration spokesmen who 
are going to have to make those the priority targets, among assure us that a burgeoning Persian Gulf confiict will not be 
others. And to write those otI and say that degrading them is another Vietnam. I think they are right on that. The territory 
really not going to play a big role to me is bewildering. But of Iraq and Kuwait is dilferent in most respects from that of 
we'll wait and hear from Director Webster at a later point. Vietnam, particularly in terms of geography and vulnerabili~ 
Supporters of prompt military action argue that our olfen- to air attack and economic embargo. Iraq is vulnerable to 111' 
sive military capability will degrade if our huge force sits for attack. The conditions of warfare will be vastly ditierent frolll 
months in the Saudi desert. This is also true, and for several those in Vietnam. · · -
months I have suggested that we should institute a policy of Of course there are military lessons we should remem~r 
unit rotation, commencing with quick reaction forces, such as from Vietnam. We should hit military targets at the outset with 
the 82nd Airborne, that might be needed on short notice else- overwhelming and awesome powei; at the beginning of any · 
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conflict, as well as knocking out power and communications, 
nuclear, biological. and chemical facilities. 
At the same time, we should not "overlearn" the Vietnam 
lesson. We in America like instant results. We want-fast food 
and we ~~nt fast military victories. However, our Nation places 
a much higher value on human life, especially on the lives-of 
·our-men and _women jn uniform. Depending :UJ?On develop-
menis after the first wave of air attacks. a short war may be 
possible and may save" lives, but we must avoid an "instant 
victory" kind of psychology with demands and expectations i_n 
this country that could cause a premature and high casualty 
assault on heavily fortified Kuwait by American ground forces. 
We don't want to create a psychology that puts preuure on our 
military commanders in the field to do things that are foolish 
because we think they should get it over with quickly. We hope 
they will be able to do it with a minimum loss of life. 
But if war becomes necessaiy, we should not tell our military 
commanders to get it over with quickly. no matter what. No. The 
order should be to acmmplish the mission with whatever force is 
required, but do so in a way that minimizes American casualties, 
even if inalces more time. Making continued Iraqi occupation.of 
Kuwait untenable with air and naval bombardment plays to our 
strengths. Rooting out the Iraqi army with ground forces going 
against heavy fortification plays right into Iraq's hands. 
Mr. President, in conclusion, a message to Saddam Hussein: 
You are hearing an impassioned debate emanating from the 
U.S. Capitol, both the House and the Senate. These are the 
voices of Democracy. Don't misread the debate. If war occurs, 
the Constitutional and policy debates will be suspended and 
Congress will provide the American troops in the field what-
ever they need to prevail. There will be no cutoff of funds for 
our troops while they engage Iraq in battle. President Bush, 
the Congress, and the American people are united that you 
must leave Kuwait. We differ on whether these goals can best 
be accomplished by administering pain slowly with an eco-
nomic blockade or by dishing it out in large doses with military 
power. Either way, Saddam Hussein, you lose. 
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Mr. President, in concluding, and in closing, I can think of 
no better person to quote than General Norman Schwarzkopf, 
Commander of U.S. forces in_ the Gulf, who will bear the heavy 
responsibility of leading American forces into combat, if war 
should occur. -
On the question of patience, General Schwarzkopf said in 
mid-November in an intervit;)Y, quoting him: 
"If the alternative to dying is sitting out in the sun for 
anoiher·summer, then that's not a bad alternative." 
On the qiiestii:>n of cost of waiting for sanctions to work, 
General Schwalzkopf also said in an interview in November, 
quoting him: 
"I really don't think there's ever going to come a time 
when time is on the side of Iraq, as long as the sanctions 
are in effect, and so long as the United Nations coalition 
is in effect." 
On the question of effect of sanctions, General Schwarz-
kopf said in October - and this is immediately prior to a 
major switch in the Administration's policy - immediately 
prior to it - quoting General Schwarzkopf: 
"Right now, we have people saying, 'OK, enough of this 
business; let's get on with it.' Golly, the sanctions have 
only been in effect about a couple of months •... And now 
we are starting to see evidence that the sanctions are 
pinching. So why should we say 'OK. we gave them two 
months, they didn't work. Let's get on with it and kill a 
whole bunch of people.' That's crazy. That's crazy." 
End quote, from the Commander in the field. 
Mr. President, in closing, I believe that before this Nation is 
committed to what may be a large-scale war, each of us in the 
Senate of the United States in reaching a decision which will 
be very personal and very difficult for all of us, we should ask 
ourselves a fundamental question: will I be able to look at the 
parents, the wives, the husbands, and children in the eye and 
say their loved ones sacrificed their lives for a cause vital to the 
United States, and that there was no other reasonable alter-
native? MJ:. President, at this time, I cannot. 
